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INTRODUCTION

Most Americans associate the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center (WTC) in New York with the violent deaths of nearly
three thousand victims within hours from the time that jetliners
crashed into the twin towers.' Less attention has been focused on the
more than sixty thousand postcollapse responders who, over a tenmonth period, engaged in round-the-clock rescue, recovery, and debris-removal efforts at the site. 2 Many of the responders-police officers, firefighters, construction workers, and others-allegedly
suffered injury and death from exposure to the hazardous environments in which they worked. 3 This Article describes the tort litigation
in federal district court on behalf of the more than ten thousand responders who claimed to have suffered injury due to their on-site
4

exposures.

Governmental responses aimed at compensating the injured victims of the 9/11 attacks began immediately and are unique in the
history of American jurisprudence.5 Within days of the attack, Con-

I

See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 357, 361 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
2 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(stating that workers cleared the WTC site in just under ten months); ANTHONY DEPALMA,
CITY OF DUST: ILLNESS, ARROGANCE, AND 9/11, at 217 (2011) (reporting that, while the exact
number of Ground Zero workers is unknown, Mount Sinai Hospital, which treated many of
those who toiled at Ground Zero, "settled on 60,000 as the best estimate").
3 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 414 F.3d 352, 358-59 (2d Cir. 2005);
Anthony DePalma, Illness Persisting in 9/11 Workers, Big Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2006, at Al; Anthony DePalma, Debate Revives as 9/11 Dust is Called Fatal, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
14, 2006, at Bl.
4
Workers at Ground Zero on 9/11 Face Settlement Deadline, NJ.com (Nov. 8, 2010, 5:29
AM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/11/deadline_forsettlement_offer.htmi
(reporting that more than ten thousand plaintiffs sued the City of New York and others for
their handling of the WTC cleanup).
5
1 KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER l1TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at v (2004), available at http://
www.justice.gov/final-report.pdf (describing the VCF as a "unique and unprecedented experiment"); see also In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 500
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (observing that the claims arising out of the 9/11 cleanup operation were
"not typical mass tort claims").
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gress enacted legislation that created a no-fault Victim Compensation
Fund (VCF) and channeled attack-related civil litigation into federal
court.6 Those victims not included in the VCF brought tort actions in
subsequent years against the City of New York and a number of private
contractors who supervised work at Ground Zero and other sites to
which debris was transported.7 In 2004, to protect the City of New
York and the contractors from potentially crushing tort liability, Congress again stepped in and created the Captive Insurance Company
(Captive), which provided $1 billion to defend tort claims arising
from debris removal, and to pay such claims when warranted., Ultimately, in late 2010, over ten thousand such claims were settled for
between $625 million and $712.5 million.9 The litigation and ultimate settlement of these claims took place in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York, presided over by Judge Alvin K.
Hellerstein.' 0 On December 22, 2010, nine years after the enactment
6

Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA), Pub. L. No. 10742, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41 (2001).
7
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 525-26, 542-43. The
WTC site was divided into four quadrants with a primary contractor assigned to each quadrant. Id. at 529. The primary contractors were Tully Construction (Zone 1), Bovis Lend
Lease (Zone 2), AMEC Construction (Zone 3), and Turner Construction (Zone 4). Id.
The primary contractors in turn entered into subcontracts with over 140 specialty subcontractors that were needed to provide various services to complete the recovery effort. Id.;
see also Overview of the World Trade Center Litigation Settlement Process Agreement, As Amended,
WORBY GRONER EDELMAN & NAPOLI BERN LLP, http://www.877wtchero.com/docs/Over
view-of-the-World-Trade-Center-Litigation-Settlement-Process-Agreement-As-Amended.pdf
(last visited Sept. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Overview of Settlement Process] (providing a complete
listing of the subcontractor defendants). Plaintiffs also sued Weeks Marine, Inc., which
operated barges that transported Ground Zero debris to the Fresh Kills Landfill, and the
contractors at the Fresh Kills Landfill. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 21 MC
100, 21 MC 103, 2010 WL 4683610, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2010). The contractors at
the Fresh Kills Landfill were Phillips & Jordan, Inc., Evans Environmental & Geological
Science and Management LLC, and Taylor Recycling Facility, LLC. Id. at *1.
8 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 517-18
(2003).
9 Mireya Navarro, Sept. 11 Workers Agree to Settle Health Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
2010, at Al; Overview of Settlement Process, supra note 7, at 1.
10 ATSSSA, § 408(b) (3), 115 Stat. at 241 ("The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions
brought for any claim (including any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death)
resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.").
Once the 9/11 cases were filed in the Southern District of New York, they were consolidated before Judge Hellerstein. Robin J. Effron, Disaster-Specific Mechanisms for Consolidation, 82 TuL. L. REv. 2423, 2428 (2008). Before agreeing on the final settlement, the
parties had originally consented to a settlement that would have provided payouts totaling
$575 million to $657.5 million. Mireya Navarro,judge Rejects Deal on Health Claims of Workers
at Ground Zero, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2010, at A12. However,Judge Hellerstein rejected that
first settlement claiming it did not adequately compensate plaintiffs. Id.; Transcript of Status Conference at 54, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 21 MC 100(AKH)
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010)].
For more on the initial settlement, see infra Part VI.
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of the first VCF," Congress amended the earlier legislation, creating a
supplemental, no-fault Victim Compensation Fund (VCF-2).12 This
revision enabled a broader range of injured victims, including bystanders not engaged in debris-removal efforts,' 3 to receive health
benefits1 4 and share in $2.775 billion of compensation.' 5
This Article chronicles and analyzes the events and the strategies
that led to the 2010 settlement of the tort litigation. The authors of
this Article actively participated in managing and shaping many of
these events and may lay claim to insights to which others may not
have direct access. Nevertheless, almost all of the factual information
upon which this Article relies is part of the public record. As such,
any scholar who wishes to double-check and evaluate this Article's factual information may do so. It will help to sharpen the focus of this
analysis if the authors identify at the outset some events on which this
Article will not focus. The 2001 VCF has been the subject of a substantial body of literature examining the manner in which the VCF special
master, Kenneth R. Feinberg, administered the distribution of the
Fund.' 6 This Article will not revisit those developments. The VCF will
receive mention only as it directly relates to the tort litigation in which
the authors participated. Nor will this Article attempt to assess the
Michael McAuliff, Senators ApproveJames Zadroga 9/11 Health Bill After Months ofPar11
tisan Bickering, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 22, 2010), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-1222/news/27085256 1_health-bill-coburn-chuck-schumer. The President signed the
Zadroga Act into law on January 2, 2011. James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation
Act of 2010, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,027, 36,027 (June 21, 2011) (to be codified as amended at 28
C.F.R. pt. 104).
12 See generally James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-347, 124 Stat. 3623 (codified at scattered sections of 26 and 41 U.S.C. (2011))
(amending the first VCF legislation).
13 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,029;
Carl Campanile, Zadroga Zone Expands 10 Blocks to Canal, N.Y. POST (Aug. 30, 2011), http://
www.nypost.com/p/news/local/zadrogazone-expands blocks to-canal loCxmD7bXIEU
Z6xKKRWplN; Alison Gendar, Zadroga 9/11 Health FundExpanded Past Ground Zero to People
in Neighborhood Sickened by WFC Attacks, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 21, 2011), http://articles.
nydailynews.com/2011-06-21/local/29707112-1-john-feal-zadroga-ground-zero.
14 Congress allocated approximately $1.5 billion for health benefits. See generally
James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, 124 Stat.
3623 (amending the first VCF legislation).
15 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,028.
From the $2.775 billion appropriated, "[olnly $875 million may be spent in the first five
years of the program with the remainder being paid out in the sixth year." Id.
16 See generally Elizabeth Berkowitz, The ProblematicRole of the Special Master Underrining the Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 24 YALE L. & Po.'Y REV. 1
(2006); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Special Master of the Fed. September IIth Victim Comp.
Fund of 2001, Speech: Negotiating the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001:
Mass Tort Resolution Without Litigation (Sept. 14, 2004), in 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 21
(2005); Tracy Hresko, Restoration and Relief Proceduraljustice and the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, 42 GoNz. L. REv. 95 (2006); Stephan Landsman, Introduction, Symposium, After Disaster: The September 11th Compensation Fund and the Future of Civiljustice, 53
DEPAUL L. REv. 205 (2003).
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VCF-2 created by the 2010 Zadroga Bill (now Zadroga Act). The work
of the special master on that project, Sheila Birnbaum, will extend
over the next six years. 7 This Article will reference VCF-2 only as it
relates to the tort litigation that took place in Judge Hellerstein's
court. Finally, this Article will not discuss the tort-related litigation
brought by those who were killed or injured by the terrorist-related
crashes at the WTC site, the Pentagon, and the field in Shanksville,
Pennsylvania, or other litigation related to the 9/11 cases. Judge Hellerstein presided over all those cases.
The personal injury litigation arising out of the WTC debris-removal operations deserves careful scrutiny. The claims raise novel legal issues, some of which will confront courts for decades to come.',
Equally deserving of attention are the methods employed in managing the most complex case in the history of American mass tort litigation.' 9 More than ten thousand plaintiffs-in separate, though
related, actions-alleged over three hundred different diseases that
they claimed were either brought on or aggravated by their exposures
to the dust-borne toxins at or near Ground Zero.2 0 Some plaintiffs
were exposed to the WTC site for only a few hours and others for
more than ten months. 2 1 They came to the litigation with a wide variety of medical conditions that predated their 9/11 exposures.2 2 Many
were tobacco users.2 3 At the times they came to the work site, the
plaintiffs ranged in age from eighteen to seventy-four.24 Depending
on where on the site they worked, the responders were exposed to
different combinations of toxins with the potential to cause different
types of diseases.2 5 Most plaintiffs, at some time or other during their
James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,028.
18 See infra Part VII.
19 See infra Parts IV, VII.
20 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
("[P]laintiffs, in the aggregate, claim approximately 387 diseases ranging from the most
life-threatening to the merely irritating.").
21 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 357, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Telephone Interview with Ned Adams, 9/11 Litig. Database Adm'r, Tech. Concepts & Design, Inc. (July 5, 2011).
22
NYC Sees Fraud in Some 9/11 Health Claims, CBS NEws (Mar. 11, 2010, 11:05 PM),
Defendants
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/02/17/national/main6218041.shtml.
also reported that they did a statistical sampling of five hundred plaintiffs, which showed
that seventy-eight percent have an elevated body mass index that would categorize them as
morbidly obese, obese, or overweight. Transcript of Status Conference at 37-39, In re
World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 21 MC 100(AK-) (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2008).
23 Memorandum from James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Special Masters
toJudge Alvin K. Hellerstein, to judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist.
of N.Y. 12-13 (Sept. 24, 2009) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Sept. 2009 Memorandum]; see Denise Mann, Years Later, 9/11 Rescue Workers Still Show Decreased Lung Function,
CNN (Apr. 7, 2010, 9:25 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/04/07/911.
rescue.lungs/index.html.
24 Telephone Interview with Ned Adams, supra note 21.
25 In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 500.
'7
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work on-site, were provided with protective equipment such as
facemasks and different types of respirators. However, access to training and supplemental equipment such as respirator filters, fitness of
the masks for the demands of the worksite, and supervisor insistence
that responders use the masks varied widely. 2 6 No other tort litigation, whether based on widespread environmental contaminants or
on mass-marketed prescription drugs, has ever presented so many different injuries caused by such varying degrees of exposure to such
indeterminate toxins. 2 7 How courts successfully managed these cases
to conclusion is of more than anecdotal interest. Important lessons
are provided here, not the least of which relate to the institutional
capacity of any court to manage such nonclass, mass tort litigation involving so many interrelated variables.
I

How 10,000-PLUS

RESPONDER-PLAINTIFFS

WOUND UP IN FEDERAL

COURT RATHER THAN CLAIMING AGAINST THE VICTIM COMPENSATION

FUND (VCF)

To understand how 10,000-plus responder-plaintiffs brought tort
actions in federal court against the City of New York and its contractors rather than sought compensation from the VCF, it is necessary to
briefly review the statutory and regulatory structures that governed
the compensation scheme enacted immediately after the attacks.
Congress established the VCF as part of the Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA). 28 The Act provided for nofault compensation for persons suffering "physical harm" who were
"present at the World Trade Center . .. in the immediate aftermath"
of the crashes.2 9 Regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice elaborated upon these terms. The regulations provided brightline rules that limited recovery to those who suffered actual physical
injury or death within twelve hours of the crashes as a direct result of
the attacks.3 0 For rescue workers, the immediate aftermath included
the period "until 96 hours after the crashes."3 1 "Physical harm" included physical injury to the body that was treated within twenty-four
hours of the injury being sustained or within seventy-two hours for
26 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 531-36 (S.D.N.Y.
2006); see DEPALMA, supra note 2, at 59.
27 In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 500; Transcript of Status
Conference at 21, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Transcript of Status Conference (Dec. 10, 2008)].
28 ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41 (2001).
29
Id. § 405.
30 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.2 (2003).
31

Id.
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those who initially failed to realize the extent of their injuries. 3 2
Under the regulations, the physical injury had to be verified by contemporaneous medical records created by the medical professionals
who provided the necessary care.3 3 Those rescue workers who suffered respiratory injuries that did not manifest within seventy-two
hours could apply for a waiver of the seventy-two-hour rule. 3 4 The
regulations, however, did not permit waivers for the twelve-hour and
ninety-six-hour time limits that helped to identify who was present in
the "immediate aftermath" of the crashes.3 5 Finally, all VCF claims
had to be filed no later than December 22, 2003.36 The overwhelming
majority of claimants in the 9/11 tort litigation in federal court could
not satisfy these VCF eligibility criteria.
Although responder-plaintiffs injured during debris removal
mainly targeted the City of New York and its contractors in the tort
actions, 9/11 plaintiffs joined several other major defendants.3 7
These additional defendants included the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey (Port Authority), which owned the Twin Towers, and
several contractors that the Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps)
had engaged to transfer the debris to a landfill site in Fresh Kills and
to examine it for personal effects and human remains."8
32
Id. ("The term physical harm shall mean a physical injury to the body that was
treated by a medical professional within 24 hours of the injury having been sustained, or
within 24 hours of rescue, or within 72 hours of injury or rescue for those victims who were
unable to realize immediately the extent of their injuries or for whom treatment by a medical professional was not available on September 11 . . .
33
Id.
34
Id. (providing that the special master may waive the seventy-two-hour rule "for rescue personnel who did not or could not obtain treatment by a medical professional within
72 hours").

35

Id.

See I FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 112. There were 108 claims that were filed
after the December 22, 2003 deadline, but only "Il were accepted as timely based on a
finding by the Special Master that the Claimant had taken sufficient action prior to the
deadline to effect a timely filing." Id.
37
See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d, 520, 542 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
38
Id.; see In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., Nos. 21 MC 100(AKH), 21 MC
103, 2010 WL 4683610, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2010). These additional defendants
ultimately settled with plaintiffs, adding slightly more than $100 million to the value of the
settlement. Id. The Port Authority settled the litigation for $47.5 million. Id. The Army
Corps employed three companies to work at Fresh Kills: Phillips & Jordan, Evans Environmental & Geological Science and Management LLC, and Taylor Recycling Facility, LLC.
Id. at *1. The plaintiffs eventually settled with all Fresh Kills defendants for a total of $24.3
million. Id. at *1-2. Additionally, after the Captive settled and paid out the claims against
Weeks Marine, the Captive sought indemnity from Weeks Marine and its insurer. Telephone Interview with Christopher R. LoPalo, Worby Groner Edelman & Napoli Bern, LLP
(June 2011). Consequently, the Captive settled with Lloyd's of London on behalf of Weeks
Marine for $28 million and, pursuant to the settlement agreement, assigned the recovery
to the plaintiffs. In re World Trade Cr. Disaster Site Litig., 2010 WL 4683610, at *2. The
36
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II
THE

BASIs

OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT'S
THE

9/11

JURISDICTION

To HEAR

RESPONDERS' TORT LITIGATION

In early 2003, hundreds of plaintiffs filed individual actions in
New York state courts alleging that they suffered respiratory injuries as
a result of working at the WTC crash site, the Fresh Kills landfill site,
or on the trucks and barges that transported debris from the crash site
to Fresh Kills. 39 The plaintiffs alleged that the City of New York and
the Port Authority had violated multiple sections of the New York labor laws that require an employer to provide "reasonable and adequate protection and safety to the persons employed" in "areas in
which construction, excavation or demolition work is being performed."4 0 Defendants sought, and the court granted, removal to federal court. 4 ' Defendants successfully argued that the ATSSSA vests
original and exclusive jurisdiction in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York "over all actions brought for any
claim . . . resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft

crashes of September 11, 2001."42
In Hickey v. City of New York, one of the first responder cases
before Judge Hellerstein, the judge confronted the scope of jurisdiction of the federal court. For how long after the initial crash could a
federal court consider the plaintiffs' claims as "resulting from or related to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes"?4 3 Judge Hellerstein
held that, immediately after the crashes, when the rescuers were
searching for survivors, the claims "resulted from or related to" the
plaintiffs also settled with Survivair, Inc., the manufacturer of respirators used in the aftermath of 9/11, for $4.1 million. See id.
39 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 357, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Prior to 2003, there were claims brought against the City of New York, the Port Authority,
and others for nonrespiratory injuries suffered at the WTC site. See, e.g., Spagnuolo v. Port
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 245 F. Supp. 2d 518, 519-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (hearing a claim by
plaintiff allegedly struck by a falling oxygen tank).
40 N.Y. LAB. LAw § 241(6) (McKinney 2006); In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster
Site Litig.,
456 F. Supp. 2d at 542, 568, 573 ("Plaintiffs . . . assert claims for negligence, wrongful
death, derivative plaintiffs, and for violations of New York Labor and General Municipal
Law.").
41 In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d at 363.
42 ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408(b)(3), 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001); see In re World
Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d at 363. In McNally v. Port Authority of New York
& Newjersey, the Second Circuit held that the ATSSSA created a federal cause of action as
the exclusive remedy for damages arising out of the aircraft crashes of September 11. 414
F.3d 352, 380 (2d Cir. 2005). However, the court stated that "[w]hat [the] ATSSSA ...
displaces is not the substantive standards governing liability, but only the state-law damages
remedies." Id. Thus, the substantive law for a decision in the 9/11 litigation, taking place
in federal court, must be derived from state law. ATSSSA § 408(b) (2); McNally, 414 F.3d at
380.
43 In re World Trade Cr. Disaster Site Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d at 368.
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crashes." However, by September 29, 2001, the search for survivors
had ended and "the mandate officially shifted. . . to demolition of the
ruined structure and clean-up of the mountain of debris."4 5 From
that point forward, Judge Hellerstein reasoned that the responders'
claims, based on violations of New York labor laws, resembled typical
workplace injuries, and should be litigated in state courts having
greater familiarity with the nuances of those laws.4 6 Judge Hellerstein,
however, stayed remand to the state courts to allow the parties to first
appeal his decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-

ond Circuit. 4 7
In McNally v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, decided in
2005, the Second Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the
appropriateness of the district court's remand to state court. 4 8 In
strongly worded dicta, the court made clear that Judge Hellerstein's
limitation of his jurisdiction to pre-September 29 claims was unwarranted.4 9 The court of appeals read ATSSSA to mean that Congress
intended to cover all tort claims arising from the terrorist crashes and
that the Act imposed neither a temporal nor a geographical limitation
on those injured by inhalation of toxic dust emanating from the crash
site.5 0 Accordingly, the court of appeals invited Judge Hellerstein to
44

Id. at 374.

45

Id. at 361.
Id. at 374 (holding that "without a more definite statement of congressional in-

46

tent," a federal court should not "oust the court having expertise interpreting" the labor
law statutes implicated in this litigation).
47
Id. at 381. Judge Hellerstein certified for interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Second
Circuit Court of Appeals the question of bow broadly to interpret the ATSSSA's grant of
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) authorizes district judges to certify an
order for interlocutory appeal when they are "of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation." However, interlocutory appeal was only available for cases
remaining with judge Hellerstein and not those that were subject to his remand order. 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006); see In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d at 381.
48
McNally v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 414 F.3d 352, 371 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that
the district court's remand orders are unreviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)).
49 Id. at 380 ("[W]e see no basis for the district court's ruling that ATSSSA's preemptive effect differs depending on whether the respiratory injuries were suffered at the World
Trade Center site or elsewhere, or on whether those injuries were suffered before or after
midnight on September 29. Nothing in the language of the statute or the legislative history suggests such lines of demarcation.").
50
Id. The Second Circuit conceded that there will be claims whose connection to the
September 11 aircraft crashes will be "too tenuous" to justify a decision that they are related to those crashes. Id. "[Blut we make no attempt to draw a definitive line here. We
need not take the phrase 'relating to' to any metaphysical extreme in order to conclude
that it encompasses the claims brought before the district court here, i.e., that airborne
toxins and other contaminants emanating from the debris created by the crashes caused
respiratory injuries to plaintiffs employed to sift, remove, transport, or dispose of that debris." Id.
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reconsider his decision limiting federal jurisdiction.5 1 On remand,
Judge Hellerstein adopted the court of appeals' dictum. 5 2 Meanwhile,
during the two years of appellate proceedings, the litigation had not
substantially progressed.
III
RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS' IMMUNITY FROM
TORT LIABILITY

In February 2005, promptly after remand, Judge Hellerstein
called a status conference to discuss the issue of whether the defendants in the tort cases could raise valid immunity defenses on a number
of state and federal grounds.5 3 The City of New York and its contractors argued that they were responding to an emergency and were thus
immune from tort liability on both state and federal immunity doctrines.5 4 Before the defendants removed the cases to federal court, a
state court had recognized a New York statute immunity defense for
injuries occurring between September 11 and September 29, 2001.55
Given that a successful immunity defense would be dispositive on liability, Judge Hellerstein ordered accelerated pretrial discovery on that
issue.56
51 Id. at 381.
52 Judge Hellerstein adopted the Second Circuit's recommendation on July 22, 2005.
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
53 Transcript of Status Conference at 12-18, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Transcript of Status Conference (Feb. 7, 2005)]. Judge Hellerstein believed that the immunity issue needed to be
resolved quickly because the plaintiffs needed to know to what extent they have a case, and
the defendants needed to know whether they would have to deal with these cases in a
substantive manner. Transcript of Status Conference at 12, In reWorld Trade Ctr. Disaster
Site Litig., 21 MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2005). This information, Judge Hellerstein reasoned, would allow both sides to properly value the cases and bring them to a point where
settlement discussions were possible. Id.
54 In re World Trade Or. DisasterSite Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
55 Daly v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 793 N.Y.S.2d 712, 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (holding that the New York State Defense Emergency Act (SDEA), N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW

§§ 9101-9200 (McKinney 2006), grants immunity for injuries incurred up to and including
September 29, 2001, when the search for survivors was still ongoing).
56 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 539. Because of the
importance of resolving the immunity question rather quickly, Judge Hellerstein ordered
the parties to engage in limited discovery focusing on the defendants' anticipated immunity defenses, even before the Second Circuit had decided how broad to interpret the
scope of federal jurisdiction under the ATSSSA. Id. Thejudge initially directed the parties
to proceed on this limited course of discovery "with the aim of establishing a joint offer of
proof, alleviating [p] laintiffs of the burden of proving all factual averments." Id. However,
at a Status Conference on November 7, 2005, the judge realized the parties would not
reach agreement on ajoint offer of proof and conceded that it would be futile to invest any
further efforts in the matter. Id.; Transcript of Status Conference at 17, In re World Trade
Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 21 MC 100, 21 MC 102 (S.D.N.Y. November 7, 2005). Despite the
lack of agreement on a joint offer of proof, the judge ordered the parties to complete
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In October 2006, Judge Hellerstein issued a lengthy opinion dealing with the subject of immunity.5 7 Regarding possible immunities
under state law,5 8 the critical issues were whether the City of New York
and its contractors had performed debris-removal activities under
emergency conditions and whether the activities were undertaken in
good faith.5 9 Judge Hellerstein held that neither of these issues could
discovery, which occurred in early 2006, and to proceed to make their immunity arguments by motion. In re World Trade COr. DisasterSite Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 539-40.
57 In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
58 Id. at 546 (noting that defendants claimed immunity under the UNCONSOL.
§§ 9101-9200, New York State and Local Natural Disaster and Man-Made Disaster
Preparedness Act (Disaster Act), N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 20-29 (McKinney 2006), and New York
common law).
The SDEA's immunity provision states,
The state, any political subdivision, municipal or volunteer agency ...
or any individual, partnership, corporation, association, trustee, receiver or
any of the agents thereof, in good faith carryingout, complying with or attempting to comply with any law, any rule, regulation or order duly promulgated or issued
pursuantto this act, any federal law, or any arrangement, agreement or compact for
mutual aid and assistanceor any order issued by federal or state military authorities,
relating to civil defense, including but not limited to activities pursuant
thereto, in preparation for anticipated attack, during attack, or following
attack or false warning thereof, or in connection with an authorized drill or
test, shall not be liable for any injury or death to persons or damage to property as the result thereof.
UNcoNsoL. § 9193(1) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Disaster Act defines a
"disaster" as the "occurrence or imminent threat of wide spread or severe damage, injury,
or loss of life or property resulting from any natural or man-made causes, including ...
terrorism." EXEC. § 20(2) (a). "Upon the threat or occurrence of a disaster, the chief executive of any political subdivision is ... authorized and empowered to and shall use any and
all facilities, equipment, supplies, personnel and other resources of his political subdivision
in such manner as may be necessary or appropriate to cope with the disasteror any emergency
resulting therefrom." Id. § 25(1) (emphasis added). The Disaster Act further immunizes a
political subdivision "for any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of any officer or employee in carrying out the provisions" of the act. Id. § 25(5). New York common law immunizes acts that are: (1) "'completely sovereign in nature and completely foreign to any
activity which could be carried out by a private person'"; and (2) discretionary in nature.
In re World Trade Ctr.DisasterSite Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 558-59 (quoting Williams v. State,
456 N.Y.S.2d 491, 493 (App. Div. 1982)).
59 UNcoNsoL. §§ 9103(5), 9193(1); EXEC. § 25(1). The SDEA's immunity provision is
limited to activities related to "civil defense." UNcoNsoL. § 9193(1). When the activities
are taken in response to an attack, civil defense measures include "emergency medical,
health and sanitation services; . . . essential debris clearance; emergency welfare measures;
immediately essential emergency repair or restoration of damaged vital facilities . . . ." Id.

§ 9103(5) (emphasis added). Similarly, Disaster Act immunity is not provided for all "actions taken in consequence of a disaster, but instead only to those actions which are necessary to cope with the disaster." In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at
558. The SDEA only immunizes activity taken "in good faith carrying out, complying with
... any rule, regulation or order duly promulgated ... relating to civil defense." UNCONSOL. § 9193(1) (footnote omitted). The defendants contended that the relevant "good
faith" inquiry "is not how the Defendants acted, but rather why the Defendants acted," and
that the immunity provision should apply because the city agencies and private contractors
that responded to the September 11 tragedy did so in response to declarations of emergency and executive orders issued by New York officials. In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite
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be decided before completion of full discovery.6 0 Assuming that the
collapse of the towers presented an emergency, how long did that
emergency last?6 ' At what point in time, if ever, did the rescue and
recovery effort become routine, nonemergency debris removal?6 2
Furthermore, if serious breaches of safety requirements occurred during the ten-month debris-removal period, had the City of New York
and its contractors acted in good faith?6 3 Judge Hellerstein ruled that
the record then before the court was inadequate to support any findings on the issues presented to him.
The district court's October 2006 decision also addressed arguments by the City of New York and its contractors that they were entitled to derivative federal immunity, also known as the government
contractor defense.64 The defense extends the immunity traditionally
enjoyed by the federal government "for actions taken in furtherance
of its government functions to private entities hired to facilitate the
government in the implementation of its programs and goals."6 5
Litig, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 552. Judge Hellerstein disagreed, however, and held that good
faith "may not be inferred simply from the fact that, at the time of the allegedly negligent
acts, the Defendants were acting in a manner responsive to a declaration of emergency."
Id. at 552-53 ("Although the question of why the Defendants acted may ultimately prove
critical to determining immunity under the SDEA, the interests ofjustice mandate also a
consideration of how the Defendants acted.").
60 In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 554-55, 558.
61 Id. at 553 ("The limitation of immunity to acts undertaken in the context of an
emergency is essential to ensure 'the least possible interference with the existing division
of the powers of the government and the least possible infringement of the liberties of the
people."' (quoting UNcoNsoL. § 9102)).
62
See id. at 554 (observing that, although the existence of an emergency is "without
question," the issues of "whether the emergency lasted for days, or weeks, or months, and
in connection with which precise activities, are fact-intensive questions, not possible to answer in connection with a Rule 12 motion addressed to the pleadings").
63
Id. at 555-56 (noting that although defendants developed a health and safety plan
for the workers, the pleadings also indicate "there were critical lapses in the enforcement
of safety standards and in the dissemination of vital information about the safety of the air
at Ground Zero to those most affected, the workers themselves"). Thus, the judge could
not determine whether good faith existed on a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the
pleadings; moreover, a determination on whether good faith existed is an issue for the jury
to decide. Id.
See id at 559-67.
6
Id. at 560 (citing Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940)). The
65
government contractor defense was created to shield "the contractor from being held liable when the government is actually at fault" but is otherwise not subject to liability. Trevino v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1478 (5th Cir. 1989). However, such
immunity only arises "where the government: (a) approves in its discretion reasonably precise specifications, (b) supervises and controls the implementation of those specifications,
and (c) the contractor is not aware of reasons not known to the government why the
application is unsafe or unreasonable." In re World Trade Cr.DisasterSite Litig, 456 F. Supp.
2d at 563 (citing Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1480). Thus, immunity does not apply when an
independent contractor acts independently of the federal government. Id. Furthermore,
derivative federal immunity only operates where there is a "significant conflict between the
state law and a federal policy or interest." Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 509
(1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, it "will not preclude recovery
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Defendants argued that federal agencies had controlled major
portions of the cleanup efforts, to wit: (1) the Army Corps had asserted control over health and safety monitoring at Fresh Kills, (2) the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) had assumed
the lead role for distribution of respiratory equipment and training at
Ground Zero, and (3) the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) had assumed lead responsibility for environmental monitoring
and hazardous waste removal. 66 After reviewing the relevant federal
authorities, Judge Hellerstein held that the question was whether the
contractors had merely carried out the dictates of the federal agencies-in which event, immunity might attach-or whether they did
"something materially different or additional" for which they could be
answerable in tort. 67 On each of the issues, Judge Hellerstein found
sufficient evidence to lead one to believe that the City of New York
and its contractors substantially controlled their own activities and did
not act merely as agents of the federal government.68 Judge Hellerstein's opinion concluded that the record was not sufficiently developed to enable the court to draw the boundary between federally
mandated management decisions and decisions reached independently by the various nonfederal defendants.69 Because further facfor injuries occasioned by violation of state statutes if the entity could have abided by those
statutes while implementing the agency's specifications." In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster
Site Litig., 521 F.3d 169, 197 (2d Cir. 2008).
66 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 563. The Army Corps
retained the services of several contractors to assist in the creation and enforcement of a
comprehensive health and safety plan for Fresh Kills. Id. at 536-37. Specifically, the Army
Corps enlisted Evans Environmental & Geosciences to develop an environmental safety
and health plan, while Phillips & Jordan was retained to act as the construction manager
for the site, which included overall responsibility for the enforcement of the health and
safety plan. Id.
67
Id. at 563-64 ("[T]o the extent that the relevant federal agencies did not exercise
oversight over Defendants' actions, federal immunity will not operate to protect Defendants from liability by suspending application of state law.").
68
See id. at 564-67. Judge Hellerstein found that all the federal agencies "operated at
the site in an advisory capacity only, never divesting the City of its authority or its duty to
protect those working at its behest." Id. at 565. Concerning claims arising from Fresh Kills,
Judge Hellerstein found that, not only had there not been a showing of Army Corp's control that would endorse the extension of derivative federal immunity to the various Defendants, in fact, "the record suggest[ed] that the City continued to exercise an independent
degree of supervisory control over operations." Id. at 564. As to OSHA, the judge found
that, despite being named as the lead agency in charge of respirator distribution and training, in practice it "continued to work [merely] in an advisory capacity, providing assistance
only as needed and requested by the City." Id. at 564-65. Moreover, OSHA declined to
assume any enforcement role, which was left to the City agencies and the primary contractors, and instead limited its inspectors to merely report any violations to the primary contractors. Id. at 565. As for the EPA's role at Ground Zero, the judge found that it lacked
any authority to enforce health and safety policies on non-EPA employees. Id. Moreover,
the EPA exercised its responsibility over toxic waste removal in conjunction with the City's
Department of Environmental Protection. Id.
69
Id. at 566.
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tual development was necessary, Judge Hellerstein concluded that he
could not decide the issue of federal derivative immunity on motion.7 0
Finally, Judge Hellerstein dismissed the claim of immunity under the
federal Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), which shields the federal government from "liab[ility] for
any claim based upon the exercise or performance of or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
Federal agency or an employee of the Federal Government in carrying
out the provisions" of the Federal Response Plan.71 The Stafford Act,
he concluded, does not grant immunity to nonfederal actors.72
The defendants sought to appeal the district court's immunity decision to the Second Circuit.7 3 The defendants claimed that their appeal was of right, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral
order doctrine. 74 Defendants asserted that, as a result of their appeal,
the district court was divested of jurisdiction to conduct further pretrial proceedings.7 5 In this connection, the defendants asked the district court to certify the immunity issue for interlocutory appeal.7 6
After the parties' briefing, Judge Hellerstein denied the request for
certification in early January 200777 and further held that the district
court retained its jurisdiction because the request for expedited appeal did not meet the demanding requirements of the collateral order
70

Id.

42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006); In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at
566. By declaring a National State of Emergency, on September 14, 2001, President
George W. Bush thereby activated the Stafford Act. In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig,
456 F. Supp. 2d at 533. Activation of the Stafford Act allowed for federal assistance to flow
to New York City "pursuant to the framework outlined in the Federal Response Plan." Id.
The Federal Response Plan is an agreement among twenty-seven federal agencies that "establishes a process and structure for the systematic, coordinated, and effective delivery of
federal assistance to address the consequences of any major disaster or emergency declared under the [Stafford Act]." Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
72
In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 566-67; see also In reWorld
Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 469 F. Supp. 2d 134, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying as a
matter of law defendants' claim to derivative Stafford Act immunity).
73
In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 136-37. The district court
issued its immunity opinion on October 17, 2006. In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig.,
456 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
74
In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 137. See generally28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (2006) (providing circuit court of appeals with jurisdiction "from all final decisions"
of the U.S. district courts, "except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court"); Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (defining the collateral order doctrine as
a "practical construction" of 28 U.S.C. § 1291's final decision rule that "accommodates a
'small class' of rulings, not concluding the litigation, but conclusively resolving 'claims of
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action'" (quoting Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949))).
75
In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 137.
76
Id. (noting that, on November 15, 2006, the defendants asked judge Hellerstein to
certify his opinion for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)).
7
See id. at 145.
71
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doctrine. The defendants then petitioned the Second Circuit for a
writ of mandamus to halt the district court proceedings pending the
appeal ofJudge Hellerstein's immunity ruling.7 9 The court of appeals
initially granted a temporary stay of proceedings, and several months
later a permanent stay, in order to review the immunity issues.80 Arguments were then heard on October 1, 2007.81 Five days later, the
Second Circuit lifted the stay, 2 allowing the tort cases to proceed to
trial.83
On the same day that Judge Hellerstein refused to dismiss the
plaintiffs' claims based on the immunity defenses, he informed the
parties that he intended to appoint a special master to help organize
the case. 84 Judge Hellerstein expressed displeasure with the vagueness of the complaints and the parties' inability to firmly establish how
many claims they were bringing and how many of them actually alleged serious injuries.8 5 He also expressed frustration with the court's
seeming inability to move to resolution cases of such great, public importance. 86 Judge Hellerstein suggested the appointment of the thendean of Hofstra Law School, Aaron D. Twerski, and ProfessorJames A.
Henderson, Jr. of Cornell Law School.8 7 After hearing opposition
from the plaintiffs to his suggested special masters, Judge Hellerstein
appointed the two academics (coauthors of this Article), pursuant to
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on December 12,
2006.88
The special masters' primary charge was to organize the claims so
there would be a reliable count of the plaintiffs involved and to assist
the court and the parties in moving the litigation forward.8 9 Just as
the special masters were to begin these tasks, however, the Second
78 Id. at 140. See generally Hallock, 546 U.S. at 349-50 (setting forth the requirements
of the collateral order doctrine); Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 2006)
(same).
79 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 503 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2007).
80

Id.

81

Id.

82 Id. at 171. Though the Second Circuit lifted the stay, it retained jurisdiction to
decide the pending appeal. Id.
83 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
84 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH), 2006 IL 2948821,
at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2006).
85
86

Id.
Id

87 Transcript of Status Conference at 42, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Transcript of Status Conference (Nov. 3, 2006)].
88 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH), 2006 WL 3627760,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2006); see FED. . Cv. P. 53.
89

In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 2006 WL 3627760, at *1; see In re World

Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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Circuit, as explained, placed a stay on all proceedings.9 0 Thus, the
special masters did not commence their work until the middle of October 2007.91
When the special masters were finally able to begin their work,
the cases appeared even more daunting than earlier. The $1 billion
allocated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
that the plaintiffs' liaison counsel had believed adequate to effect a
reasonable settlement was now described as insufficient. The liaison
counsel now wanted to pursue his case against the private contractors
and their insurers, seeking discovery of all relevant insurance policies.
Furthermore, it was unclear how to fashion meaningful discovery of
ten thousand cases that differed so greatly on their individual facts.
Accordingly, Judge Hellerstein sought to find ways to allow the cases
to move forward. The sections that follow set forth in detail how this
was accomplished.
IV
THE MANY STEPS TO FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIMS

Neither Judge Hellerstein nor the special masters were privy to
the negotiations between the parties and therefore cannot speak definitively as to the specific path that brought them to settle the case.
The authors do believe, however, that it is possible to identify important steps along the way that moved the parties from what appeared to
be a stalemate in December 2007 to the presentation to the court of a
settlement agreement in early March 2010.92 The following factors
were, in the authors' opinion, of great importance: (1) issuance by the
court of a core discovery order requiring responses to a number of
important questions; 9 3 (2) agreement on objective medical criteria to
be incorporated in a Severity Chart that ranked injuries according to
relative severity; 94 (3) development of a comprehensive, electronicallysearchable database;95 (4) adoption of a schedule for early discovery
90
91

See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
See In re World Trade Cir.DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 501-02; Order Regu-

lating Discovery at 1, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH)
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2007).
92 Transcript of Status Conference at 2, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No.
21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2010) (hereinafter Transcript of Status Conference
(Mar. 12, 2010)]; see In reWorld Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH), 2008
WL 793578, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2008) (stating that the Core Discovery Order, issued
in late 2007, was necessary to enable the parties to create paradigms that could eventually
lead to a settlement).
93 See Clarifying Order Regulating Discovery at 2-4, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster
Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Clarifying Order].
94
95

See In re World Trade Cir. DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 531-33.
Id. at 502, 506-22 (providing a printout of the database).
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and trials;9 6 (5) selection of plaintiffs, using the database, for early
trials;9 7 and (6) comprehensive correlations of data from the
database.
A.

Issuance of a Core Discovery Order

Judge Hellerstein was convinced in December of 2007 that sufficient information had not yet been obtained to allow the parties to
begin to discuss a reasonable settlement.9 8 He believed that if the parties were left to their own devices, the cases would drag on endlessly.99
Thus, immediately after the Second Circuit lifted its stay, Judge Hellerstein conferred with the special masters to develop a core discovery
order. 0 0 At this stage in the litigation, the ambiguity that characterized plaintiffs' pleadings frustrated Judge Hellerstein.' 0 He believed
that the pleadings did little to crystallize the issues and did not permit
serious settlement discussions or promote resolutions by trial.1 0 2 Consequently, in the discovery order, Judge Hellerstein sought detailed
information for each plaintiff with regard to where and when the
plaintiff worked in connection with on-site debris removal. 03 He
sought information regarding the specific work done by each plaintiff
for each subcontractor-employer. 10 4 For example, he asked what acts
or omissions did the plaintiff allege and how did those acts or omissions cause plaintiffs injury.1 05
The core discovery order also asked for detailed information for
each plaintiff regarding the availability of personal protective equip96
97
98

Id. at 523-24.
Id.

Transcript of Status Conference at 15, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
No. 21 MC 102(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Transcript of Status Conference (Nov. 16, 2007)].
9 See Transcript of Status Conference (Feb. 7, 2005), supra note 53, at 5-6.
100 See In re World Trade Or. DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 501. The parties and
the court "needed core discovery to provide the fundamental facts of the cases, the varying
responsibilities of government agencies and contractors, and the complex layers of insurance coverage." Id. To that end, Judge Hellerstein enlisted the special masters to help
"devise such discovery, and to develop computer systems to collect the information and
make it accessible." Id.
10
See Order Granting Motion for Leave to Amend Plaintiffs' Master Complaint at 1,
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2006)
(describing plaintiffs' master complaint as "conclusory, repetitive, . . . sloppy," and
"vague").
102
See Transcript of Status Conference (Nov. 16, 2007), supra note 98, at 24-25.
103 See Clarifying Order, supra note 93, at 2. Judge Hellerstein required plaintiffs to
identify where they worked by "quadrant, cross streets, landmarks, monuments, nearby
buildings, etc." Id.
104 Id. The judge wanted each plaintiff to identify the hiring entity, the type of work
the plaintiff was engaged to perform, the type of work the plaintiff actually performed,
whom the plaintiff reported to on a day-to-day basis, and who directed the plaintiffs work
on a day-to-day basis. Id.
105

Id.
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ment and instructions for its proper use.10 6 Another set of questions
sought information regarding the nature and severity of the injuries
allegedly suffered by each plaintiff. 0 7 In similar fashion, the order
required information regarding when each plaintiffs injuries manifested themselves, which health care providers treated each plaintiff,
and the attendant medical diagnosis, if any. The core discovery order
also required each plaintiff to provide full medical records going back
to 1995.108 Finally, the order demanded that plaintiffs produce infor-

mation regarding the compensation, if any, they had received from
collateral sources for the injuries they suffered at any of the WTC
sites. 109

The core discovery order required the defendants to answer
many of the same questions asked of the plaintiffs; discrepancies, if
any, between plaintiffs' and defendants' responses to the same question would then be the subject of further discovery. 0 The order also
called for disclosure of all contractual agreements for work performed
by the defendants and for disclosure by the defendants of any indemnification and insurance that might be available to cover claims releAlmost all of the data provided in response to
vant to the litigation.'
the core discovery order were later entered into a database that the
judge ordered the parties, with the help of the special masters, to
construct.1 1 2
B.

Development of a Method for Ranking Injuries According to
Relative Severity

In order to decide which cases were appropriate for early trial
and to render the claims amenable to settlement, it was necessary to
106 Id. at 3. Thejudge wanted the plaintiffs to specify their claims against each defendant concerning protective equipment used or not used. Id. For example, each plaintiff
was to identify if protective equipment did not fit, if it was inappropriate for use, if the
provided instructions were inadequate, or if the plaintiff encountered any other problem
with regards to protective equipment. Id.
107

Id.

108 Id. Defendants initially requested plaintiffs' complete medical records so they
could determine whether a particular plaintiff suffered from a preexisting condition.
Transcript of Status Conference (Nov. 16, 2007), supra note 98, at 36-38. The judge rejected that request and held that the defendants are only entitled to the medical records
created afterJanuary 1, 1995. Clarifying Order, supra note 93, at 3. However, if defendants
could explain, in a particular case, why they needed records dating prior to 1995, the judge
indicated that he would grant their request. Transcript of Status Conference (Nov. 16,
2007), supra note 98, at 39-40.
109 Clarifying Order, supra note 93, at 4 (requiring plaintiffs to divulge the source of
compensation and the amount that was received).
110
Id. at 3-4.
11,
Id. at 4.
112 See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH), 2008 WL
793578, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2008); see also infra Part IV.C (chronicling the development of the database).
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develop a method for comparatively evaluating the severities of the
injuries suffered by the various plaintiffs. 1 3 Given that the plaintiffs
alleged over three hundred types of injuries, 1 4 severity criteria could
not be established for all of them.' 1 5 Nor could reliance be placed on
the often subjective, wide-ranging descriptions and diagnoses contained in the plaintiffs' individual medical records. The court and the
parties required objective criteria in order to identify which plaintiffs
were more, and which were less, severely injured." 6
As it turned out, monographs published by the American Medical
Association (AMA) and the American Thoracic Society (ATS) supplied objective criteria for those categories of diseases that plaintiffs
reported with greatest frequency to have resulted from their exposures to the WTC sites.1 17 From a larger number of possibilities, the
parties, with help from the special masters and approval by the court,
selected for evaluation chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD), emphysema, interstitial lung disease, asthma, reactive airways dysfunction syndrome (RADS), laryngial diseases, chronic rhinosinusitis, and gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD). 1 18 For the
most part, the resulting Severity Chart ranked these diseases on a scale

113 Transcript of Status Conference at 6-7, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
21 MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Transcript of Status Conference (Sept.
16, 2008)].
114
See supra note 20.
115
Transcript of Status Conference (Sept. 16, 2008), supra note 113, at 6-8.
116

Id.

In reWorld Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Id. at 503; Transcript of Status Conference (Sept. 16, 2008), supra note 113, at 8.
COPD, emphysema, interstitial lung disease, asthma, and RADS are all diseases of the
lower respiratory system. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
Laryngitis, pharyngitis, and chronic rhinosinusitis are diseases of the upper respiratory system. Id. at 532. GERD, Barrett's esophagus, gastritis, esophagitis, and gastrointestinal stricture were all diseases enumerated in the Severity Chart and are diseases of the upper
digestive tract. Id. at 533. The Severity Chart actually consisted of three charts. Id. at
533-34. Chart One ranked the severities of enumerated ailments afflicting WTC plaintiffs.
Id. at 503. Chart One only contained illnesses ranked by the AMA or ATS and only included plaintiffs tested pursuant to criteria promulgated by the AMA or ATS. Id. at
531-33. Chart One did not verify the accuracy of plaintiffs' assertions "that they suffer
from particular diseases or, for that matter, that those diseases were caused or aggravated
by exposures to WTC conditions." Id. at 534. Furthermore, Chart One only ranked diseases within each disease category and did not compare severities across the disease categories. Id. at 533. Thus, the chart was merely intended to provide the parties and the court
with useful information on some of the current illnesses afflicting plaintiffs, not to measure
the monetary value of the claimed injuries or to account for injures that WTC conditions
caused. Id. Chart Two dealt with plaintiffs that previously had diseases enumerated in
Chart One but were either cured or their illnesses, to some degree, had ameliorated. Id. at
534. Chart Three was intended to capture injuries enumerated in Chart One for which the
required tests had not been performed. Id. at 534-35.
117

118
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of zero to four, with four being the most severe and zero being notyet-medically supportable. 1 9
The court was confident that a significant sampling of the plaintiff population for these diseases would support overall assessments of
how many plaintiffs were seriously or moderately injured and how
many suffered only minor or, as yet, insignificant injuries. 2 0 The Severity Chart did not include some diseases, including cancers and cardiac problems, 2 1 nor did it attempt at this stage to establish a causal
nexus between the WTC exposure and the diseases suffered. 2 2 The
Severity Chart, in addition to allowing for a comparative assessment of
the severity of each individual plaintiffs claimed injuries, provided a
rough cut, aggregate assessment of the overall seriousness of the injuries in the plaintiff population. 123 In the authors' opinion, the Severity Chart turned out to be a significant factor in moving the parties
toward settlement.
C.

Development of a Comprehensive Database

From the outset of the special masters' appointment, Judge Hellerstein urged the development of a database housed by a neutral entity with experience in dealing with complex data-processing issues. 2 4
Judge Hellerstein reasoned that a fully populated database would
eventually allow the parties to settle the litigation by enabling the parties to assign values across various categories of claimed injuries.' 2 5
After choosing a consultant with expertise in utilizing computer technology in complex litigation and a company with an impressive record
of dealing with litigation databases, the court turned to the task of
selecting the kinds of information to be entered.126 Months of negoti119 In re World Trade Cir. DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 503. The enumerated
diseases of the upper digestive tract were rated on a scale of zero to two. Id. at 533.
120 See Transcript of Status Conference (Sept. 16, 2008), supra note 113, at 18-20.
121 In re World Trade Cir. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 531-33. The Severity
Chart did not include cancers and cardiac problems for two reasons: (1) unlike the respiratory diseases, any attempt at this early stage to establish a causal relationship between exposure to the toxins at the HTC site and these diseases was highly speculative, and (2) the
variation in severity for these diseases was so great that rating on objective criteria was
impossible.
122 Id. at 534.
123 Transcript of Status Conference (Sept. 16, 2008), supra note 113, at 18.
124 See Transcript of Status Conference at 10, 32-34, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster
Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Transcript of Status
Conference (Nov. 28, 2006)].
125 In re World Trade Cr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 505.
126 See id. at 522; In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH), 2008
WL 793578, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2008) (recalling the prior retention of Timothy M.
Opsitnick ofJurinnov Ltd. to assist with vetting the competing bids made by several technology vendors and approving Technology Concepts & Design, Inc. to create and operate
the litigation database).
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ation involving the special masters and the parties ensued.127 At one
point, in response to an invitation from the masters to prepare "wish
lists," the parties suggested over twelve hundred questions to be propounded to the plaintiffs and defendants.1 28 In December 2008, after
considering the critiques of counsel from both sides,' 29 the special
masters recommended to the court that 368 questions be included in
the database.13 0
Many of the database questions required the parties to provide
multiple answers.) 3 For example, some 387 diseases were numerically coded and listed in an attachment (i.e., pick list) from which
each respondent selected the appropriate responses. 1 32 Many plaintiffs suffered from a number of diseases.'3 3 The database required
plaintiffs to identify their medical providers and to state the time periods during which they sought medical help.134 Some plaintiffs had
consulted many physicians and had been hospitalized in various
places on different occasions.1 35 In all, ninety-two fields out of a total
of 368 in the database contained pick lists.' 36 The topics included in
the database covered such issues as work background data,'3 7 tobacco
use,13 duration of work at debris sites,139 respirator use,14 0 preexist127 See In re World Trade Ctr.DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 522; Order Regarding
Database Objections at 1, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH)
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2009).
128 Data Elements Chart, Sept. 15, 2008 (on file with authors).
129 Memorandum from James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, Special Masters
to judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, to judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist.
of N.Y. (Dec. 21, 2008) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Dec. 2008 Memorandum].
130
See Order Regarding Database Objections, supra note 127.
131
See In re World Trade Cr. DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 506-22. To foster
clarity, each database field stated which party (or parties) were to answer that question and
what type of answer the party was to insert. Id. Certain database fields required responses
from a pick list while other fields required the party to answer either yes or no or to fill in
the blank with either numerals, dates, or text. Id.
132
September 11th Litigation Database, operated by Technology Concepts & Design,
Inc.
133
Telephone Interview with Ned Adams, supra note 21.
134
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 511-12. The database
fields required plaintiffs to answer when their conditions were diagnosed, who made that
diagnosis, how such a diagnosis was made, whether drugs were prescribed to treat the
condition, and whether the diagnosis required surgery. Id.
135 Telephone Interview with Ned Adams, supra note 21.
136
See In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 506-22.
137
Id. at 506. Questions asked included: Did the defendant hire plaintiff? Where did
plaintiff work? On which dates did plaintiff work? Was the plaintiff hired to work on a fulltime basis? What type of work was plaintiff supposed to engage in? Did defendants generally provide protective equipment to its ATC employees and, if so, what types? Id.
138
Id. at 508.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 509. Each plaintiff had to answer whether respirators were made available,
what types of respirators were available, who provided the respirator, on what dates the
plaintiff wore the respirator, and whether the plaintiff was instructed on how to properly
use the respirator. Id.

148

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 98:127

ing diseases,1 4' collateral source benefits,142 diseases for which recovery was sought,143 and diagnostic tests.' 44 The database required
plaintiffs to answer whether they sought to recover for any disease that
qualified for a ranking on Chart One of the Severity Chart and, if so,
for which diseases and at what level of impairment.14 5 For defendants,
the database asked whether they had insurance in addition to the policy provided by the Captive.' 4 6
D.

Selection of Claims for Early Trial

By early December 2008, the special masters had recommended
to Judge Hellerstein the final format for the database fields.147 The
judge approved their recommendations.148 He then set forth a rigorous schedule for the parties to populate the fields with the relevant
information. 4 9 In a case management order (CMO) and accompanying flow chart, he divided the plaintiffs into five groups of two thousand plaintiffs, or five cohorts. 5 0 In order to accelerate the process,
the judge required the parties to enter information for each cohort
for a select group of thirty-five database fields within forty days.' 5 1
141 Id. at 510.
142 Id. at 514-15. The database inquired whether each plaintiff was provided any collateral source payment related to WTC work (including insurance, government, VCF,
Medicare, Medicaid, or Social Security) and, if so, what type. Id. The database also asked
for the amount each plaintiff received and when such payment was received. Id.

143

Id. at 511.

Id. at 512. The plaintiffs were asked whether they had undergone any diagnostic
tests in connection with a condition for which they seek recovery in this litigation. Id. If
so, they had to provide the types of diagnostic tests they underwent, when they underwent
such testing, and who performed the tests. Id.
145 Id. at 513-14. Other fields asked whether the plaintiff seeks to recover for impairments under Chart Two and Three. Id.
146 Id. at 519-20. If the defendant did, further questions asked what type of insurance
may be available, who the carrier is, and what the policy limits are. Id. Ultimately, of
course, a smaller subset of the database questions and responses turned out to be, in the
authors' view, important in moving the parties to settlement. However, it's likely that more
of the database information would have been utilized if the cases had actually gone to trial.
147
See generally Dec. 2008 Memorandum, supra note 129 (responding to the objections
to the special masters' suggested database provisions).
148
Order Regarding Database Objections, supra note 127.
149
In re World Trade Or. DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 523-24.
150 See id. at 523-24. Judge Hellerstein divided the plaintiffs into groups A through E.
Id. at 523. Groups A through D had two thousand plaintiffs each. Id. Specifically, group A
consisted of plaintiffs with case index numbers 1 through 2,000; group B was comprised of
plaintiffs with case index numbers 2,001-4,000; and each successive 2,000 cases were
placed in another group. Id. The last group, group E, consisted of all plaintiffs with case
index numbers 8,001 and higher. Id.
Id. at 523. The parties were required to enter the information for the first cohort
151
within forty days of January 1, 2009, or by February 9, 2009. Id. Thereafter, the parties
were required to repeat the same steps for each cohort, with each group commencing the
process forty days after the previous group began. Id. The thirty-five questions appeared
in the database and inquired about very basic information. Id. Specifically, these questions consisted of a plaintiffs case profile information, a plaintiffs duration of exposure at
144
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Thereafter, using the responses to these thirty-five fields, the special
masters were to choose from each cohort of two thousand plaintiffs a
subset of two hundred claims involving relatively severe injury and an
additional twenty-five claims involving injuries that did not appear on
the Severity Chart (e.g., cancer, cardiac).152 Forty days after the special masters selected the 225 claims, the parties were required to populate the entire database for those cases.15 3 The responses to the 368
database questions would be adequate to allow the special masters and
parties to identify claims for discovery and early trial. Each of the major parties-the plaintiffs' liaison counsel and the City of New Yorkwas to choose two plaintiffs from each subset of two hundred for early
discovery and trial. 154 The court would also choose two plaintiffs and
could select from both the subset of two hundred and from the
twenty-five plaintiffs whose injuries did not appear on the Severity
Chart.15 5
All choices by the parties and the court (six in total from the first
subset of 225) were to be completed by April 10, 2009.156 Parties
could engage in extensive discovery as soon as the plaintiffs for early
discovery and trial were chosen.15 7 Discovery for this first group of six
plaintiffs was to be completed by November 21, 2009 and all pretrial
motions were to be filed byJanuary 5, 2010 and argued by February 4,
2010.158 The CMO contemplated that, by May 16, 2010, thirty claims
the WTC site, a plaintiffs preexisting disorders, the injuries for which a plaintiff seeks
recovery, and the severity of a plaintiffs claimed injuries. Id. The information for the
select group of thirty-five database fields was to be entered for all plaintiffs by July 19, 2009.
Id. at 528.
152
Id. at 523. No specific criteria existed for the selection of these additional twentyfive cases. Id. at 523 n.t. The rationale for choosing these twenty-five cases was to enable
various types of cases to be selected for discovery and trial. Id.
153
Id. at 504. On the same day the special masters selected the 225 cases, they were
also required to identify 400 additional cases (chosen at random) from that group of
2,000. Id. The parties were to populate the database for these 400 cases 120 days later,
with the same process repeated every forty days for the next group of 2,000 cases. Id. By
November 27, 2009, the parties were required to have fully populated the entire database
for 3,125 cases, taken from all five groups (five multiplied by 625). Id. at 505. Finally, the
CMO required the parties to populate the database for each of the 1,375 cases in each
group that was not selected as part of the 225-case subgroup or the 400-case subgroup and
to have the entire database populated for each filed case by January 1, 2011. Id. Judge
Hellerstein warned counsel that strict adherence to the schedules was critical to the efficient administration of the cases and that failure to answer timely would be cause for involuntary dismissal. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 187
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
154
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
155
Id. at 523-24. Because Judge Hellerstein sought early discovery and trial from a
broader range of injuries, the court was to choose from among the non-Severity Chart
plaintiffs as well. Id. at 523 & n.t.
156
Id. at 523-24. (noting that the court was to choose its two cases for early discovery
and trial by April 10, 2009).
157
Id. at 523 (permitting full discovery on all issues relevant to trial).
158
Id. at 527, 529.
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(six from each of the five cohorts) would be ready for trial.159 The
judge anticipated starting trials on May 17, 2010.160
To summarize, this elaborate schedule, in Judge Hellerstein's
view (as reflected in the flow chart), was designed to accomplish four
goals: (1) to set fixed trial dates, (2) to allow the parties to cross-examine the database responses, (3) to ensure that settlements with individual parties would not interfere with the flow of the litigation, and
(4) to advance the claims of those most severely injured.
These selection procedures produced interesting but fairly predictable results. From the first subset of two hundred, plaintiffs' liaison counsel chose two plaintiffs who had been on the WTC site for
significant periods of time and who alleged serious respiratory injuries
that they believed could reliably be connected with on-site exposures. 1 6 ' Defendants' counsel chose plaintiffs who were in their fifties
and whose exposures to the WTC site had been relatively short.16 2
One such plaintiff smoked two packs a day and the other had serious
159 Id. at 529-30. The court, along with liaison counsel for both sides, individually
chose two cases from each of the five groups of two thousand plaintiffs. Id. at 523-24.
Thus, at the end of the process outlined in Case Management Order 8 (CMO 8), there
were thirty cases scheduled for trial. Id. at 529-30. If there had been no database, the
outcomes in these trials, often referred to as "bellwether trials," would have comprised the
only information regarding the values at which the rest of the claims should be settled.
Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in MultidistrictLitigation, 82 TUL. L. REv. 2323, 2338
(2008). In the 9/11 litigation, given the size and diversity of the claims, outcomes in six
(or even thirty) cases would not have sufficed to promote rational settlement. For this
reason, CMO 8 was designed not only to provide information to select bellwether cases but
to provide the parties with detailed and substantial information for each case. In re World
Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 504. Consequently, CMO 8 required the full
population of the 368 database questions for all cases, which would permit the parties to
discuss the degree to which the cases identified for discovery and trial were representative
and enable them to negotiate values for all cases.
160 DEPALMA, supra note 2, at 318.
161
Order Identifying Cases for Trial at 1, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
Nos. 21 MC 100(AKH), 05 Civ. 1228(AKH), 05 Civ. 1364(AKH), 05 Civ. 4111(AKH), 05
Civ. 9141(AKH), 05 Civ. 10740(AKH), 06 Civ. 3417(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2009); Memorandum from James A. Henderson,Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, Special Masters to judge Alvin
K. Hellerstein, to Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y. 2 (Apr.
7, 2009) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Apr. 2009 Memorandum]. Plaintiffs' liaison
counsel selected Joseph Greco and Frank Malone. Id. Mr. Malone was exposed to the
WTC site for 494 hours, suffered from a serious asthma condition, and underwent sinus
surgery. Id. Mr. Greco was at the WIC site for 2,795 hours and revealed injuries in almost
all of the categories on the Severity Chart, with the highest ranking in each category. Id.
162
Apr. 2009 Memorandum, supra note 161, at 2; Order Identifying Cases for Trial,
supra note 161, at 1. Defendants' liaison counsel chose Richard Ardisson and Robert
Galvani, who were respectively fifty-six and fifty-three years old. Apr. 2009 Memorandum,
supra note 161, at 2-3. Mr. Ardisson was exposed to the WTC site for thirty-six hours and
Mr. Galvani was exposed for a total of eighty-four hours. Id. At the outset, defendants
expressed a desire to take weak, problematic cases to trial to see if juries would find causation in such cases and, if they imposed liability, how they would value such cases. Transcript of Status Conference (Dec. 10, 2008), supra note 27, at 32-34.
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preexisting respiratory conditions.1 6 3 The plaintiffs' liaison counsel
expected that the defendants would mount a Daubert challenge to
plaintiffs' expert proof on causation.1 6 4 Therefore, the judge believed
it was important that the issue be faced early on in a cancer case. 6 5
Thus, one of Judge Hellerstein's selections was a firefighter, Mr. Hauber, who died from esophageal cancer six years after exposure to the
WTC site.166 He was forty-one years old on 9/11 and had spent approximately three months working full time at Ground Zero.16 7 Doctors from the New York City Fire Department determined that Mr.
Hauber's cancer was related to his exposure to contaminants at the
WTC site.16 8 The judge's other selection was a construction worker,
the only nonuniformed plaintiff among the first six to be chosen.169
163
Apr. 2009 Memorandum, supra note 161, at 2-3 (noting that Mr. Ardisson suffered
preexisting conditions of asbestosis, bronchitis, COPD, and GERD.).
164
See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993) (requiring the district court to function as a gatekeeper and only admit expert testimony after
"a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue"). In making a determination under Daubert, the trial judge
considers, among other things: (i) "whether a theory or technique . . . can be (and has
been) tested," (ii) "whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication," (iii) "the known or potential rate of error" of a particular technique, and (iv)
whether the technique or theory is "general accept[ed]" within the "relevant scientific
community." Id. at 593-94. Thus, plaintiffs' liaison counsel chose cases in which it
thought it would be difficult to mount a successful Daubert attack given the existing (and
growing) literature that supported a causal connection between exposure at Ground Zero
and diseases such as asthma and COPD. See DEPALMA, supra note 2, at 218-19, 223
("[Mount Sinai] found that the rate of asthma among the 20,000 ground zero responders
who had been screened between 2002 and 2007 was twice as high as in the general population."). See generally Robin Herbert et al., The World Trade Center Disaster and the Health of
Workers: Five-Year Assessment of a Unique Medical ScreeningProgram, 114 ENVrTL. HEALTH PERSP.
1853 (2006) ("HrTC responders had exposure-related increases in respiratory symptoms
and pulmonary function test abnormalities that persisted up to 2.5 years after the attacks."); G. Moscato & M.R. Yacoub, World Trade Center Disaster: Short- and Medium-Term
Health Outcome, 67 MoNALDI ARCHIVE FOR CHEST DISEASE 154 (2007) (reporting the health
effects of various lengths of exposure to the toxins present at the WTC site); Jonathan M.
Samet et al., The Legacy of World Trade Center Dust, 356 NEW ENo. J. MED. 2233 (2007).
165
See Transcript of Status Conference at 59-60, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site
Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2009); DEPALMA, supra note 2, at 246, 318.
Order Identifying Cases for Trial, supra note 161, at 1; Apr. 2009 Memorandum,
166
supra note 161, at 3.
167
Apr. 2009 Memorandum, supra note 161, at 3 (revealing that Mr. Hauber was exposed to the site for a total of 872 hours and did not possess a preexisting condition or a
history of smoking).
168
Transcript of Status Conference at 38, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009).
169
Order Identifying Cases for Trial, supra note 161, at 1; Apr. 2009 Memorandum,
supra note 161, at 4-5. On February 20, 2009, defendants filed a motion seeking summary
judgment against plaintiffs who were employed as police officers or firefighters as to their
claims brought under the New York labor law and New York general municipal law. Summary Order Regarding Partial Motions to Dismiss Uniform Workers' Labor Law and General Municipal Law Claims, 21 MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009) (on file with authors).
They contended that the uniformed plaintiffs were not "employed" as labor law defines the
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He was forty-two years old at the time of his first exposure and had
developed a number of serious diseases.1 70
E.

Early Returns from the Database: Confirmations and
Surprises

The database accomplished more than providing the basis for informed selection of claims for early discovery and trial. It also enabled the parties and the court to gain overall perspectives on the
litigation. By September 2009, the court had gathered a wealth of
information.'7 1 Over nine thousand plaintiffs had given sworn responses to the selected subset of thirty-five questions, and both plaintiffs and defendants in 2,325 cases had given answers to all 368
questions in the database.1 72 The database fields relating to injuries
provided information on claims for deaths, cancers, heart attacks, and
a host of other diseases, even though the Severity Chart did not include these injuries.' 73 Below, Diagram 1 provides a snapshot of the
severities of the injuries reported in the database in September

2009:174

term, nor was there an "accident" as is required for recovery under the general municipal
law. Transcript of Status Conference at 25-26, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
21 MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2009). Consequently, the court felt it imperative to select a
case that would not be subject to the summary judgment motion, which was still pending
on April 10, 2009 when the court made its selections, and therefore selected a construction
worker.
170
See Order Identifying Cases for Trial, supra note 161, at 1; Apr. 2009 Memorandum,
supra note 161, at 4-5.
171
See generally Sept. 2009 Memorandum, supra note 23 (describing observations on
the patterns and severities of injuries included in the database).
172
Id. at 1.
173
174

Id.
Id. at 3.
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1

PLAuwrII's STATUS
Severity Chart rank 4
(most seriously impaired)
Severity Chart rank 3
(no 4s)
Severity Chart rank 2
(no 4s or 3s, or Death/Cancer/Heart Attack. A-E
injuries only.)
Severity Chart rank I
(no 4s, 3s, or 2s, or Death/Cancer/Heart Attack.
A-E injuries only.)
Severity Chart rank 0
(tested, but no 4s, 3s, 2s, or is, or Death/Cancer/
Heart Attack. A-E injuries only.)
Death, Cancer, and Heart Attack
(no Severity Chart rank 4 or 3)

GERD
(no Severity Chart rank 4, 3, 2, 1, 0 for A-E
injuries, or Death/Cancer/Heart Attack)
Residuum
(plaintiffs not included in above categories)
Totals

153

NUMBER OF

PERCENTAGE OF

PLAINTIFFS

ALL PLAINTIFFS

520

5.8%

261

2.9%

684

7.6%

1654

18.3%

898

9.9%

766

8.5%

549

6.1%

3688

40.9%

9,020

100.0%

A preliminary analysis of Diagram 1 led the special masters to the
following conclusions17 5 :
1. The combined total of injuries with Severity Chart rankings of
zero, one, and two (presumably not serious injuries) comprised
35.8% of the plaintiff population. Those claiming only GERD
(ranked only as one or two on the Severity Chart) and presumably not serious, constituted 6.1% of the plaintiff population.
Thus, 41.9% of the plaintiff population did not claim to suffer
serious injuries.

2. The 3,688 plaintiffs in the lowest "residuum" category in Diagram 1 reflect those who did not rank zero to four in any impairment category on the Severity Chart and who did not report

death, cancer, heart attack, or any ranking for GERD. Because
they did not claim injuries in any of the above-stated categories,
one could assume that most of these plaintiffs did not suffer
severe injuries. Had their health been seriously compromised,
they would quite likely have been subjected to diagnostic tests

and would have made claims reflected on the Severity Chart.
The special masters conservatively estimated that at least twothirds of the residuum category (27% of the entire plaintiff
population) did not suffer serious injuries. When one adds this
27% to the earlier figure of 41.9%, an estimated total of 68.9%
175

Id. at 3-18.
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of the entire plaintiff population had not manifested serious injuries as a result of their exposures.
3. Plaintiffs claiming for death, cancer, and heart attacks represented 8.5% of the plaintiff population. However, some of the
cancers were not likely to be life-threatening cancers (e.g., thyroid cancers and some skin cancers). More importantly, the latency period for many of the cancers for which plaintiffs sought
to recover were much longer than the time periods between
exposure and manifestation.' 76 Those claims were likely to be
vulnerable to Daubert motions on causation. 17 7 Even if only half
of the claims for death, cancer, and heart attacks were likely to
be weak, another 4.25% of all plaintiffs presented no serious
litigation threat to defendants, bringing the total of relatively
weak claims to 73.15%.
4. Thus, in the estimation of the special masters, only 27% of the
cases involved levels of severity that could potentially demand
significant recoveries. However, even these estimates were
probably high. For example, some of the diseases in the Severity Chart (e.g., rhinosinusitis), even if relatively severe for their
type, would not likely call for compensation as significant as for
diseases such as COPD or interstitial lung disease, even at lower
levels of relative severity.' 78
In short, the early information from the database indicated that the
number of seriously injured plaintiffs would likely be manageable,
thereby giving hope for a possible settlement.' 7 9
The database revealed a very surprising correlation. It is axiomatic in toxic tort cases that the length and intensity of exposure to
toxins correlate positively and strongly with the severity of the injury
to the person exposed.o8 0 However, searches in the database revealed
that the dates on which the plaintiffs were exposed (early-only, earlyand-late, or late-only) and the total lengths of exposure (twenty hours
or two thousand hours) did not correlate strongly with the numbers
176 Transcript of Status Conference at 17, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Transcript of Status Conference (Jan. 21, 2010)].
177
Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 59-60.
178 See World Trade Center Litigation Settlement Process Agreement, as Amended,
Exhibit C, available at http://www.877wtchero.com/wtcverdict/Exhibit%20C%20%20
Settlement%20Grid.pdf.
179 It can be assumed that, because the number of seriously injured plaintiffs was
found to be less than originally expected, plaintiffs' counsel agreed to settle for under $1
billion, a result the Captive insisted on so that it could reserve funds for future cases. See
Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 59; DEPALMA, Sujra note
2, at 317-18.
180 See, e.g., Sept. 2009 Memorandum, supra note 23, at 9 (noting that the special masters assumed that length and intensity of exposure to toxins would correlate with the severity of injury).
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or seriousness of injuries.' 8 ' The percentages of serious injury were
essentially flat across groups of plaintiffs distinguished on the basis of
when they started and how long they worked on the site.1 82
V
THE PARTIEs AGREE TO SETrLEMENT
Pressured by the prospect of thirty individual cases heading towards early trial, 8 3 the parties intensified their efforts to work out a
settlement in 2009.184 Relying on the database, the Severity Chart,
and their own investigations, the lawyers representing the plaintiffs,
the City of New York and its contractors, and the Captive devoted
many thousands of hours to innovative collaboration and hard bargaining over a period of many months.' 8 5 As a result, on March 11,
2010,186 liaison counsel for the plaintiffs announced a settlement of
over ten thousand claims against the City of New York and its contractors for $575 million,' 8 7 contingent on at least ninety-five percent of
the eligible individual plaintiffs agreeing to opt into the settlement. 8
And, if greater percentages of plaintiffs joined the agreement, the
value of the settlement would increase incrementally up to a total of
$657.5 million. 89 On the defendants' side, the settlement involved
only the City of New York and its contractors. Other defendants such
as the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and the Fresh Kills
contractors were not parties.o9 0 Some features of the settlement were
181 Id. at 9-10. But see Herbert et al., supra note 164, at 1855 (reporting on clinical
findings from screening examinations conducted on 9,442 Ground Zero workers between
July 2002 and April 2004, showing that "[elarly arrival at the WTC site was significantly
associated with an increased reported prevalence of both newly incident and worsened
respiratory symptoms").
182 See Sept. 2009 Memorandum, supra note 23, at 9-10.
183 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
184 See Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 12, 2010), supra note 92, at 8.
185 Id. at 8-9 (noting that Margaret Warner, counsel for the Captive, stated that the
initial settlement was the culmination of twenty-two months of exhaustive negotiations).
186 Navarro, supra note 10.
187 Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 12, 2010), supra note 92, at 15; Alison
Gendar & Corky Siemaszko, Judge in 9/11 Health Trial Orders Settlement Renegotiationfor Sick
Ground Zero Workers, N.Y. DALY NEWS (Mar. 19, 2010), http://articles.nydailynews.com/
The authors wish
2010-03-19/local/27059553_1-ground-zero-workers-settlement-lawyers.
to clarify that the approximately 10,500 cases that were filed turned out to be 9,019 cases
because the court dismissed over 1,000 cases due to various factual and technical errors. In
re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
188 Navarro, supra note 10.
189 Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 12, 2010), supra note 92, at 15-16. The
settlement stipulated that the Captive would contribute an additional $11.5 million for
every one percent of plaintiffs opting in after the ninety-five percent benchmark was
reached. Id.
190 See id. at 9; Mark Hamblett, Settlement Reached with NYC and Contractorsin 9/11 Respiratory Case, L-Aw.coM (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/articlejsp?id=120244611197
5&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
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quite innovative. For example, fixed amounts were set for three tiers
of lower levels of recovery, which allowed for quick distribution of
monies to those plaintiffs; those entitled to greater recovery were subject to more nuanced evaluation of their particular injuries. The settlement also provided for an insurance policy covering all settling
plaintiffs for a number of exposure-related cancers that might manifest in the future.)9 1
This Article has already identified what may have been the paramount consideration leading to settlement: as the parties and the special masters gathered and organized the relevant data, it became quite
clear that a majority of plaintiffs had not suffered serious injuries. 192
Thus, it appeared that seriously injured plaintiffs could be fairly compensated without exceeding the likely available funds. Second, the
availability of state and federal immunities for the City of New York
and its contractors remained in doubt and would not begin to be resolved until the district court ruled on pretrial motions.1 93 The uncertainties surrounding these all-or-nothing issues made settlement a
more attractive alternative for both sides.19 4 Third, regarding many of
the claims (e.g., those involving cancers and cardiac injuries), defendants' Daubert challenges to the admissibility of plaintiffs' expert testimony might very well have prevailed. 9 5 Without such expert
testimony, plaintiffs would lose their claims as a matter of law.1 96
None of the parties could predict with confidence how Judge Hellerstein would rule on these motions or whether his rulings would stand
up on appeal.' 9 7 And finally, defendants had raised other difficult
issues, including whether the New York Labor Law applied to the uniformed plaintiffs and whether any duties of care were owed and
breached. 9 8
In addition, the sequencing of the litigation created uncertainties
that made settlement attractive to both sides. For example, with regard to plaintiffs who suffered relatively severe respiratory injuries, defendants were reluctant to face the very real possibility that juries in
the first claims reaching trial might return high verdicts that would
make it more costly to settle the rest of the claims.' 9 9 And finally,
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Overview of Settlement Process, supra note 7, at 7-11.
See DEPALMA, supra note 2, at 323.
Id. at 318.
Id.
Id.

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
See Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 12, 2010), supra note 92, at 21-22.
198 Id. at 10; Summary Order Regarding Partial Motions to Dismiss Uniform Workers'
Labor Law and General Municipal Law Claims, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009).
199 Typically, parties to a mass tort action that have experienced jury verdicts will usually attempt to negotiate a settlement reflecting the prior verdicts. Roger H. Transgrud,
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regardless of who might win at trial, it was certain that the parties
would raise a host of legal issues on appeal.20 0 It was expected that it
would take years to obtain final appellate resolution of these issues,
even without potential Supreme Court review, complex remands, and
further motions and trial proceedings.2 0 1 And then, if reversals and
remands were to be ordered, more years might be devoted to retrying
claims.20 2 Rarely has tort litigation been confounded by so many factors that could affect the fortunes of so many differently situated
plaintiffs.2 0 3 Not surprisingly, then, once the numbers of severely injured plaintiffs were determined to be manageably low, and a rational
means of identifying those plaintiffs appeared to be possible, a settlement was almost certain to follow. Indeed, on March 11, 2010, the
parties agreed to a settlement. 204
VI
THE DISTRICT COURT'S REJECTION OF THE SETTLEMENT
On March 19, 2010, Judge Hellerstein threw a bombshell into the
proceedings by rejecting the settlement as inadequate.2 0 5 Had the
case been certified as a class action, his authority to do so would have
been clear.2 0 6 However, Judge Hellerstein had earlier decided not to
certify the WTC litigation as a class because, given the wide range of
injuries and the particular questions of causation with regard to each
injury, individual issues of causation predominated. 207 The judge believed that, even in the absence of class certification, he possessed inherent judicial authority to review the settlement and, if necessary in
Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 78. However, negotiating a

settlement in the 9/11 litigation after a high jury verdict would have been extremely difficult because the Captive wanted to reserve significant funds for future claims and was thus
reluctant to provide all its assets. See Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010),
supra note 10, at 59. Furthermore, plaintiffs' counsel might have been reluctant to settle,
even for $1 billion, after receiving an immense jury award. See DEPALMA, supra note 2, at
318.
200
DEPALMA, supranote 2, at 325. In fact, defendants filed some sixty pretrial motions,
which are currently on file with the court, on various issues of law.
201
See Transcript of Status Conference at 49, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y.June 10, 2010) [hereinafter Transcript of Status Conference (June 10, 2010)] (noting that the appeals relating to the scope of federal jurisdiction
and the relevant immunity defenses lasted approximately four years).
See David T. Tran & A. Maria Plumtree, Comparing Mediation, Arbitration and
202
Litigation 3 (unpublished manuscript), http://plumtreetran.com/documents/ComparingMediationAbritrationLitigation.pdf (noting that it could take years until the litigation process is completely exhausted).
203 Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 12, 2010), supra note 92, at 8, 10.
204
Navarro, supra note 10.
205 Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 54 ("In myjudgment, this settlement is not enough.").
206 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (stating that the court may approve a class action only after
finding it "fair, reasonable, and adequate").
207
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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the interests of fairness, to reject it.20 8 In a sharply worded statement
delivered at a highly publicized hearing, Judge Hellerstein held that
the settlement was unfair to the plaintiffs, giving them too little and
giving the lawyers too much. 209
In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that the Captive
had approximately $1.1 billion at its disposal to settle the claims. 21 0
By offering something over $600 million, the Captive was reserving
between $400 million and $500 million to protect the City and its contractors against potential liability to claimants who almost surely would
manifest 9/11-related injuries in the future.2 1' The Captive contended that it needed a substantial cushion to protect its clients
against future plaintiffs.21 2 judge Hellerstein questioned how much
the Captive should reserve, even if the City of New York had legitimate
concerns about latent injuries that might manifest themselves in the
future: "[I]s the conjectural right of the future cogent enough to outweigh the real and present needs of the present? In myjudgment, too
much is put aside for the future."2 1 3
The other major aspect concerning the settlement that troubled
the court related to attorneys' fees. 214 The fees provided for in the
attorney-client contracts allowed plaintiffs' counsel to recover onethird of the awards after deduction of expenses. 2 15 This would have
generated total plaintiffs' counsel's fees between $189 million and
$216 million, 2 ' 6 which Judge Hellerstein believed to be excessive. 217
He acknowledged that plaintiffs' counsel had taken on the claims
208
See Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 63; see also
Order Acknowledging, and Setting Hearing on, Modified and Improved Agreement of
Settlement at 2, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., Nos. 21 MC 100(AKH), 21 MC
102(AKH), 21 MC 103(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2010) (restating the court's belief that it
could "rule on the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement").
209 Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 54.
210 Navarro, supra note 10. Although, Congress appropriated only up to $1 billion for
the Captive, the Captive was permitted to earn income by investing its funds, which allowed
it to offset operational expenses. Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No.
108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 517 (2003); DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., A
REVIEW OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY 15 (2008).
211
DEPALMA, supra note 2, at 317-18.
212 See Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 59.
213 Id. In discussions with the special masters, Judge Hellerstein noted that the vast
array of private insurance had not been touched, and the Captive had not considered
using some of its reserve to purchase excess insurance to protect the city and its contractors in the unlikely event that the entire $1 billion FEMA contributed, and interest earned
thereon, might prove insufficient.
214 Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 54-56; DEPALMA,
supra note 2, at 322.
215
DEPALMA, supra note 2, at 325.
216 Michael Howard Saul, Trade Center Workers Reach Settlement, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11,
45
75116431376090518.
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870362530
html.
217 Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 56-57.
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when other lawyers had refused to do so and that litigating the claims
involved substantial risks of no recovery (and hence no fees) after
years of sometimes heavy work by plaintiffs' counsel. 2 18 Nonetheless,
the judge believed that the fees called for in the attorney-client contracts were excessive and that a reduced fee would fairly compensate
the plaintiffs' counsel for their work.219
Judge Hellerstein also expressed dissatisfaction with the relatively
small amounts allocated in the settlement to compensate those responder-plaintiffs who had contracted cancer soon after exposures to
the work site. 220 Except for cases involving blood cancers, the compensation awarded to those afflicted with cancer was minimal, reflecting the difficulty of linking these injuries with on-site exposures. 22 1
Although the judge acknowledged that such early-onset cancers would
present difficult causation problems at trial and would be subject to
Daubert challenges, he nevertheless felt that adjustments should be
made and that they would require monies in excess of the existing
overall settlement amount to provide for even modest increases in direct cash payments to those suffering from cancers. 222
The next section of this Article discusses Judge Hellerstein's authority to reject the settlement. At this juncture, suffice it to say that
the judge made clear that the 9/11 litigation did not simply present
an instance in which private parties in a lawsuit have agreed to a settlement and the judge has no power to review it on the merits. 223 The
judge, in rejecting the settlement, flatly stated that the court had the
power to control the litigation, including the settlement, and that he
had every intention of doing so. 224 It should come as no surprise that
the court's actions greatly disgruntled counsel. 2 25 They believed they
had reached a mutually acceptable deal and that Judge Hellerstein
218
219

Id. at 55.
Id. at 56. Indeed, the judge insisted that the fees should be reduced and believed
that the Captive should pay them rather than deducting them from the plaintiffs' recoveries. Id. at 55-56. In the end, the Captive never paid plaintiffs' attorneys' fees because
the judge accepted as sufficient counsels' agreement to reduce their fees from thirty-three
percent to twenty-five percent. Transcript of Status Conference (June 10, 2010), supra note
201, at 40.
220 Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 59-60. The
settlement did contain, however, a cancer insurance policy that would provide plaintiffs
that had not already contracted cancer with up to $100,000 if they were diagnosed with
certain cancers by the year 2025. DEPALMA, supra note 2, at 318-19.
221 Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 59-60.
222 Id. (revealing that the judge felt that, because the claims arose out of the 9/11
tragedy and Congress appropriated funds for plaintiffs' claims, the settlement should provide more for those suffering from cancer, even though it would be difficult for plaintiffs
to prove causation).
223
Id. at 54, 63.
224 Id. at 62-63.
225 See DEPALMA, supra note 2, at 324.
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exceeded his authority in rejecting their agreement.2 2 6 Defendants
knew that, when they returned to the negotiating table, they would
have to put up substantial new sums of money. Thus, defendants filed
notice of appeal on April 14, 2010, challenging the authority of a
judge in a nonclass context to reject such a settlement.2 2 7 Although
they did not prosecute the appeal at that juncture, defendants preserved their right to challenge the district court's authority to review
and to reject any terms of the settlement agreement or the attorneyclient fee agreements.2 28
Nonetheless, the earlier-described reasons for agreeing to a settlement continued to weigh heavily on the parties. 229 Neither side relished the idea of appellate review of the judge's authority.2 30 All
parties involved wanted finality and understood that they would be
required to make adjustments in order to avoid protracted appellate
litigation. 23 1 So, with this in mind, they returned to the bargaining
table,2 32 at several junctures calling on the special masters to assist in
working out a revised settlement that would meet court approval. 2 3 3
226
Memorandum in Support of Motion on Short Notice for Stay Pending Appeal at 2,
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., Nos. 21 MC 100(AKH), 21 MC 102(AKH), 21
MC 103(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010); DEPALMA, supra note 2, at 324.
227 Memorandum in Support of Motion on Short Notice for Stay Pending Appeal,
supra note 226, at 2; DEPALMA, supra note 2, at 324.
228
Transcript of Status Conference (June 10, 2010), supra note 201, at 3-4.
229 DEPAL.MA, supra note 2, at 324.
230 Id. at 324-25; see Transcript of Status Conference (June 10, 2010), supra note 201,
at 5.
231
Transcript of Status Conference (June 10, 2010), supra note 201, at 5.
232
Order Regulating Proceedings, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., Nos. 21
MC 100(AKH), 21 MC 102(AKH), 21 MC 103(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2010).
233
See Transcript of Status Conference (June 10, 2010), supra note 201, at 25, 35. The
revised settlement, which the parties agreed to onJune 10, 2010, increased the settlement's
value to the plaintiffs by $125 million. Order Acknowledging, and Setting Hearing on,
Modified and Improved Agreement of Settlement, supra note 208, at 1; DEPALMA, supra
note 2, at 325. The Captive agreed to place an additional $50 million into the settlement
agreement. Transcript of Status Conference (June 10, 2010), supra note 201, at 7. The
City of New York and its workers' compensation insurer agreed to waive its liens on any
recovery a plaintiff will receive from the settlement, resulting in an additional $20 million
for plaintiffs. DEPALMA, supra note 2, at 325. Furthermore, plaintiffs' counsel voluntarily
agreed to reduce its fee from thirty-three percent to twenty-five percent, resulting in plaintiffs receiving an extra $55 million. Id. The agreement required at least ninety-five percent
of all eligible plaintiffs to participate for it to take effect. Overview ofSettlement Process, supra
note 7. Under the agreement, the Captive agreed to contribute between $625 million and
$712.5 million, depending upon various contingencies. Id. Specifically, for every one percent of plaintiffs that opt in after the ninety-five percent benchmark was reached, the Captive agreed to contribute another $12.5 million. Id In addition, the Captive agreed to pay
an additional $25 million if future lawsuits were limited to a certain number and its payouts
to future claimants or to those that opt out of the settlement fall within fixed limits. Id.
There were several components to the agreement. Id. Every eligible plaintiff was to receive an initial payment of $3,250 and could apply for a cancer insurance policy offered by
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Id. Under the policy, plaintiffs would receive
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VII
ASSESSING THE DISTRICT COURT'S MANAGEMENT OF THE
9/11 RESPONDERS' LITIGATION: THE SPECIAL
MASTERS' PERSPECTIVES 234
A.

Early Phases of the Litigation: Traditional Approaches Did
Not Move the Litigation Towards Settlement

When it became clear that more than ten thousand plaintiffs
were bringing tort claims against the City of New York and its contractors based on allegations of 9/11-related injuries and that the claims
would be heard in a single federal district court, it also became clear
that parties would have to settle most of the claims. 285 Only a relatively small number of cases could have ever been brought to trial.2 36
Admittedly, trials of bellwether claims might have encouraged a small
number of settlements by helping to place value on other claims. 237
But absent a comprehensive database that allowed for categorization
of claims based on the answers to a host of questions reflecting a mulup to $100,000 if they are diagnosed with certain types of blood and respiratory cancers by
June 2025. Id.
234 This part expresses the special masters' view as to the judge's role and authority in
managing the litigation.
235 See Transcript of Status Conference (Nov. 3, 2006), supra note 87, at 24; Peter H.
Schuck, judicial Avoidance ofJuries in Mass Tort Litigation, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 479, 482-83
(1998). Attorneys for both plaintiffs and defendants are reluctant to try mass tort cases
because of the potential consequences of suffering an early decisive defeat at trial. Id. at
483.
236 See Transcript of Status Conference (Jan. 21, 2010), supra note 176, at 9.
237 In mass litigation not involving an extensive database, bellwether trials aim to accomplish several goals. First, bellwether trials create momentum toward a broad settlement. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for "Trialby Formula,"90 TEX. L. REv. 571, 631 (2012).
Second, they inform settlement discussions by indicating potential jury awards. Fallon et
al., supra note 159, at 2338. In the 9/11 litigation, it is doubtful that bellwether cases would
have performed this second function given the great disparity of the injuries suffered by
the plaintiffs. Finally, they provide counsel with the opportunity to organize the products
of discovery, evaluate the evidence and the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments,
and comprehend the risks associated with proceeding to trial. Id. at 2337-38. To ensure
that the bellwether trials are representative of the many individual cases, courts have required the parties to produce a limited amount of information on each individual action
to identify the major variables that the cases selected for early trial ought to represent. See
id. at 2344 ("In the Vioxx MDL, this was achieved with limited case-specific discovery
through the exchange of plaintiff and defendant profile forms."); see also In re Vioxx Prods.
Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 790-91 (E.D. La. 2007) (presenting a scenario in which
plaintiffs alleging a cardiovascular injury submitted to Merck a Plaintiff Profile Form containing certain biographical and medical information and, upon receipt of these materials,
Merck disclosed the contacts it had with plaintiffs' doctors and any other relevant information it had on individual plaintiffs). See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 576, 588 (2008) ("[Blellwether trials are a far more palatable method
for resolving mass litigation than the alternatives: standing on the sidelines waiting to be
heard or settling en mass."); Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, justice Improved: The
Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV.
815 (1992) (noting that adjudication through sampling and aggregative procedures is advantageous to resolving mass tort cases).

162

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:127

titude of factors, the trial of such bellwether claims would, at most,
have brought about settlements in individual claims or small clusters
of claims. The parties would not have had sufficient information to
effect a wholesale global settlement; such retail settlements would
have stretched over many decades.23 8 Most plaintiffs would have
grown old or died before the resolution of their claims-many, no
doubt, from the effects of their 9/11 exposures. Thus, the objective
of the federal district court had to be to conduct the pretrial phases in
a manner that facilitated simultaneous settlement of large numbers of
similarly situated cases rather than the sporadic settlements of individual cases.2 39 For this to occur, the parties on both sides required information on the overall factual parameters of the litigation. 240
Working through liaison counsel for both sides, in 2005, Judge
Hellerstein had begun to try to coax out the data necessary for aggregate categorization by using pleadings as a means of obtaining the
relevant facts-times and lengths of on-site exposure, types and severities of injuries, alleged wrongs of defendants, and the like-and sorting the claims into comparable groupings by using check-off
complaints. 24 1 The federal Manual for Complex Litigation explicitly
approved of some of the techniques. 24 2 In other respects, the judge
introduced innovative approaches in an effort to sort out the claims
factually. For example, the court utilized the aforementioned checkoff complaints to ascertain which claims from the master complaint
applied to each plaintiff.2 4 3 For a number of reasons, all of which
could have been predicted-and some of which this Article considers
subsequently-these preliminary efforts failed. 244 The district court
once again tried to assert control over the litigation by issuing a core
discovery order asking questions of both sides designed to generate
specific responses sufficient to categorize the thousands of claims for
purposes of reaching large-scale settlement.2 4 5 Again, although other
courts had used this technique in different settings, it proved
insufficient.
238 See generally Schuck, supra note 235, at 482-83 (touching upon the global nature of
settlements generally reached in mass tort cases).
239
See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 505 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); Transcript of Status Conference (Nov. 3, 2006), supra note 87, at 25.
240 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 505.
241
Id. at 499-500; Case Management Order No. 4 at 1-3, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2005).
242

See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION, FOURTH

§§

11.444,40.52 (4th ed. 2004),

available at https://public.resource.org/scribd/8763868.pdf (acknowledging the use of
master complaints and the creation of an electronic depository to store information produced during the course of the litigation).

243

In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH), 2006 WL 3858393,

at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2006).
244 In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
245 Id.; Clarifying Order, supra note 93, at 1.
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By mid-2006, the litigation had reached an impasse, with the only
viable option being to schedule some of the claims for trial and hope
that they and others would settle, most likely one by one or in small
groups, all over a substantial time period.24 6 Broadly speaking, it was
not that counsel on either side deliberately sought to frustrate the
court's efforts to bring order out of chaos. Impasse certainly did not
serve the plaintiffs' attorneys' interests, 2 4 7 even though plaintiffs' unhelpful responses to the court's queries contributed as much as anything to the stalemate.24 8 Instead, the primary contributor to the
roadblock was the fact that counsel for both sides were, understandably enough, approaching their roles in traditional fashion, with the
marginal best interests of their clients as their paramount priority.2 49
Sacrificing those interests even slightly in the name of collective welfare would have been, from the traditional viewpoint of the American
adversarial process, inappropriate. Traditional approaches to pretrial
discovery do not require plaintiffs to sacrifice their own interests in an
effort to allow the court to develop an aggregated, useful perspective
on the litigation as a whole. 2 50 Thus, limitations built into the traditional processes of pleading and discovery, rather than vindictive recalcitrance on the part of liaison counsel, led to destructive impasse.
In this regard, the parties faced a situation not unlike the classic prisoners' dilemma. Without some kind of significant extension of, or
even departure from, traditional judicial processes, it was difficult to
see how the 9/11 litigation would result in large-scale, wholesale settlement. 25 1 From this discouraging perspective, thousands of ostensibly seriously injured responders, many of them true heroes, had little
prospect of receiving their just due. What was called for, the following
discussions will argue, was aggressive managerial judging, using all the
powers given to a federal judge, even to a degree beyond those customarily invoked in prior mass tort cases.

246 See In re World Trade Cr. DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
247 Judge Hellerstein told plaintiffs' attorneys that he would not grant them accelerated trials. Thus, the only way plaintiffs' attorneys could earn their contingency fee is if the
cases were ready for either trial or settlement. Transcript of Status Conference (Nov. 16,
2007), supra note 98, at 24-25.
248
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 501 ("The inability of
counsel to style useful pleadings. . . made it necessary to develop an alternative manner of
proceeding.").
249
See generally CHARLEs W. WOLFRAM, MODEuN LEGAL ETHICS §§ 10.3.1-3.2 (Hornbook
Series Practitioner's ed. 1986) (discussing traditional American attorneys' professional
zeal).
250
See id. § 10.3.1, at 578-79.
251
See Transcript of Status Conference (Nov. 3, 2006), supra note 87, at 25 (stating
that, because of the number of complaints, employing traditional methods would result in
the litigation lasting "for two lives in being plus 21 years" without any resolution).
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A Brief Historical Overview of Managerial Judging in the
Federal Courts

The meaning of the phrase "managerial judging" is somewhat
elusive.252 After all, to a significant extent, judging is inherently and
unavoidably managerial. 253 Thus, trial judges routinely control evidentiary and procedural aspects of the cases brought before them and
are traditionally given fairly broad discretion to rule on these matters. 25 4 Of course, judges have less discretion and are bound to a
greater degree, as are the parties, to the guidance of the applicable
law governing the substantive issues presented in litigation. 255 Nevertheless, with respect to the procedural conduct of the trial, judges
have considerably greater leeway. Moreover, the boundaries of what is
considered appropriate are moving outward. 25 6 The "new normal"
would have been considered almost radically activist thirty years
ago.2 57 It follows that the types of managerial judging of interest in
this context are nonroutine assertions of judicial authority in which
the court takes over significant substantive aspects of the litigation ordinarily left to the parties to manage. The special masters believe that
Judge Hellerstein engaged in managerial judging, beginning when he
ordered the parties to develop a Severity Chart and a database to select and prepare cases for trial.2 58 Before assessing the legitimacy and
effectiveness of these management techniques, it is necessary to
briefly consider relevant aspects of managerial judging as they have
played out over the last several decades.
Perhaps the most remarkable historical examples of extraordinary managerial judging involve what might be termed "public law" or
"structural reform" litigation, which were aimed at reforming public
facilities such as prisons, mental health hospitals, and school systems. 259 The plaintiffs in these cases are persons who allege harm
252 E.g., E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution ofProcedure,53 U. Cm. L.
REv. 306, 309 (1986). The phrase "managerial judges" appears to have been coined by
Professor Judith Resnik in her widely cited 1982 article. Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges,
96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 378 (1982).
253
See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The ManagerialJudge Goes to Trial, 44 U. RicH. L. REv.
1261, 1261-63, 1275-76 (2010).
254 Id.
255
See Todd D. Peterson, RestoringStructural Checks onjudicialPower in the EraofManagerialJudging,29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 41, 53-55 (1995).
256
See Elliott, supra note 252, at 322-23; Jonathan T. Molot, An Old judicial Role for a
New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 29 (2003).
257
See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules-And the
Extent of Convergence with Civl-Law judging, 36 Sw. U. L. REv. 191, 192-93 (2007); Thornburg, supra note 253, at 1268.
258
See supra Part IV.
259
See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of theJudge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1281, 1284 (1976) (discussing the "characteristic features of the public law model");
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARv. L. REv.
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from abusive, entrenched institutional behaviors.2 6 0 Once a court decides that such a facility has deteriorated so badly that its perpetuation
denies inmates, patients, and students their fundamental rights and
that judicial intervention is required in order to break the impasse,
the task of redesigning the deficient facility is clearly beyond the traditional capacity of a court to accomplish. 26 ' Writers have identified
several factors that arguably distinguish this type of adjudication from
others. 262 Thus, by recognizing the rights of otherwise powerless victims of institutional abuse and by concluding that such abuse is likely
to continue indefinitely without judicial intervention, the court delegates the task of redesigning the institution to an extrajudicial process
involving public dialogue, bargaining, and compromise among interested parties acting through their representatives. 263 On this view, institutional reform is achieved through extrajudicial bargaining in a
specialized market that the court's intervention, by breaking the impasse, helps to create. Rather than federal courts actually redesigning
the facilities, judges, typically aided by special masters, enter orders
that make the extrajudicial decision-making processes possible.26 4 Examples of this sort ofjudicial intervention, which commentators often
explicitly refer to as managerial judging, recur infrequently and are
controversial. 265 But federal judges have clearly responded to the
need to rescue otherwise helpless victims from harm caused by selfperpetuating, unjust institutional impasses, and a number of legal
scholars seem to approve of such a practice. 266
C.

The District Court's Managerial Judging in the 9/11
Litigation Was Justified

In the fall of 2006, after three years of largely fruitless struggling
with traditional approaches to pleading and discovery, Judge Hellerstein appointed special masters to assist in building an expansive, electronically-searchable database that would allow the court and the
parties to access and recover reliable information about each plaintiff's claim and each defendant's defenses and to obtain big picture
1, 2-4 (1979) (discussing structural reform);James A. Henderson,Jr., Comment, Settlement
Class Actions and the Limits of Adjudication, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1014, 1017-18 (1995) (providing examples and discussing the contours of public law litigation).
260 Fiss, supra note 259, at 2; Henderson, Jr., supra note 259, at 1017.
261 James A. Henderson Jr., Contract'sConstitutive Core: Solving Problems by Making Deals,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 120.
262
Chayes, supra note 259, at 1314-15; Henderson, Jr., supra note 259, at 1017-18.
263 Henderson, Jr., supra note 259, at 1017.
264
Henderson, Jr., supra note 261, at 119-20.
265 See Resnik, supra note 252, at 391, 425-31 (observing that managerial judging results in the trial judge becoming "a consort of the litigants" as opposed to being "a detached oracle").
266
See Chayes, supra note 259, at 1303, 1316; Fiss, supra note 259, at 2-4, 9.
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overviews of the 9/11 responders' tort claims.2 67 In doing so, the
court clearly entered a managerial-judging phase of the litigation,
which ultimately included judicial review and rejection of the settlement reached by the parties.2 6 8 Was Judge Hellerstein justified in asserting such broad control? For the reasons that follow, the special
masters answer in the affirmative.
As one of the authors has previously observed, four factors justify
judicial intervention in "structural reform" or "public law"26 9 litigation: (1) the interests that the court sought to protect involve important civil rights; 2 7 0 (2) an impasse has occurred-unless the court
intervenes, presumably valid rights-based claims will never be vindicated for structural, processual reasons that do not relate to the underlying merits;2 7 1 (3) judicial intervention will make it possible for an
extrajudicial process of arm's length bargaining among interested parties to break the impasse and reach settlement;27 2 and (4) the court is
able to serve as an impartial stakeholder and guarantor of basic fairness. 2 7 3 The authors submit that these four factors were present in
the 9/11 first responders' tort litigation.
Regarding the first factor, the rights of the 9/11 plaintiffs to receive meaningful days in court may be characterized as fundamental
civil rights. 2 74 Most of the plaintiffs were threatened with more than
the usual moderate-term delays. Congress had denied their inclusion
in the VCF27 5 and had sent all 10,000-plus to pursue tort remedies in
a single federal jurisdiction-the Southern District of New Yorkwhere most of them appeared destined to wait for trials or settlements
that would never occur.2 7 6 The plaintiffs had no choice but to join
the bottleneck; they could not spread themselves over a number of
state and federal courts in other jurisdictions that, in the absence of
the federal 9/11 statute, might have been able to hear their claims
more expeditiously.2 77
267 See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Utig, No. 21 MC 100(AKH), 2006 WL 3627760,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2006); supra Part IV.
268 See Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 54, 60.
269 Henderson, Jr., supra note 259, at 1017-18.
270 Id. at 1017.
271

Id.

272

Id.

273 Id. at 1017-18.
274 See Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1060-61
(2012).
275
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.2-.3 (2003)
(providing compensation only to rescue workers who were physically harmed within
ninety-six hours of the aircraft crashes).
276 See ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408, 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001).
277 See id.
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The second factor-the existence of a seemingly unbreakable impasse in federal district court-was clearly presented.2 78 Interestingly,
it occurred inside, not outside, the court.27 9 Rather than a prison or a
school system that requires redesign, the federal civil procedure system's design itself would not function to give the plaintiffs the opportunity to have their claims heard or to join in a fair settlement.28 0 It
can be argued that whatJudge Hellerstein did in managing the 9/11
litigation was consistent with a liberal interpretation of Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 1 In any event, what threatened to
278 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 500-01 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (noting that ordinary procedural methods were incapable of advancing the
litigation).
279 See id.
280 See id.; see generally Elliott, supra note 252, at 332-33 (noting that, in cases with
unnecessarily high litigation costs, careful managerial judging can produce the most just
resolution).
281 Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that:
In any action, the court may order the attorneys and any unrepresented parties to appear for one or more pretrial conferences for such purposes as:
(1) expediting disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not
be protracted because of lack of management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation; and
(5) facilitating settlement.
(b) Scheduling ...
(3) Contents of the Order ...
(B) Permitted Contents. The scheduling order may:
(i) modify the timing of disclosures under Rules 26(a) and
26(e) (1);
(ii) modify the extent of discovery;
(iii) provide for disclosure or discovery of electronically stored
information;
(iv) include any agreements the parties reach for asserting claims
of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material after information
is produced;
(v) set dates for pretrial conferences and for trial; and
(vi) include other appropriate matters.
(c) Attendance and Matters for Considerationat a PretrialConference ...
(2) Matters for Consideration. At any pretrial conference, the court
may consider and take appropriate action on the following matters:
(A) formulating and simplifying the issues, and eliminating frivolous
claims or defenses;
(F) controlling and scheduling discovery, including orders affecting
disclosures and discovery under Rule 26 and Rules 29 through 37; .
(H) referring matters to a magistrate judge or a master;
(I) settling the case and using special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or local rule; ...
(K) disposing of pending motions;
(L) adopting special procedures for managing potentially difficult
or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems; ...
(P) facilitating in other ways the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action.
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happen to the 9/11 plaintiffs would have constituted no less an institutional breakdown than would the failures of a prison or a school
system. As for the third and fourth factors identified above-that the
court can make it possible for the parties to settle and can guarantee
the fairness of the settlement-the federal district court before whom
Congress had required the cases to be brought was exclusively in a
position to act effectively. 28 2 Once the court ordered the parties and
the special masters to construct the database and to begin to identify
individual cases for trial,28 3 and once the court began to generalize
and categorize regarding the database as a whole, the court had empowered the parties to reach a global settlement and had positioned
itself to act as an impartial guarantor of the fairness of any settlement
that the parties might reach.
One might question whether, once the parties reached agreement, Judge Hellerstein possessed the authority to review the settlement and determine its fundamental fairness or to reduce the fees to
be paid to plaintiffs' lawyers. After all, this was not a class action in
which Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives trial
judges authority to pass on the fairness of a settlement or to reduce
attorneys' fees. 284 But even acknowledging that Rule 23 did not cover
the 9/11 litigation, it presented an equally inappropriate fit with Rule
41, which broadly allows parties to terminate litigation by means of
voluntary settlements. 2 83 Rule 41 presumes a relatively close attorneyclient relationship in which the attorney deals with the client as an
individual who, based on fairly detailed information and counseling,
has substantial input into the decision regarding whether to settle and
on what terms.286 In the 9/11 litigation, each of the ten thousand
plaintiffs could only decide-on little information and after the settlement had been reached-whether to opt into an arrangement that
rested on predetermined categories of injuries and concomitant fixeddollar-amount recoveries for each category. A plaintiffs decision to
opt out meant facing years of uncertain litigation with the very real
possibility of receiving nothing in the end.
Judge Hellerstein thus had recourse to only two federal rules,
neither of which he could apply sensibly to the litigation. Given this
vacuum, he struck a balance. He approved the essential structure of
an elaborate settlement agreement but set aside those portions that
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(1-5), (b)(3)(B)(i-vi), (c)(2)(A, F, H, I, K, L, P).
282 See generally Elliott, supra note 252, at 332 (giving examples of cases involving inexperienced counsel or unnecessarily high litigation costs as instances when involved managerial judging may be appropriate).
283 In re World Trade Cir. DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 502.
284
285
286

FED. R. Cv. P. 23(e), (h).
FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a).
See id.
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he believed were manifestly unfair to plaintiffs. 2 87 He certainly had
sufficient factual grounds for his selective challenge to, and revision
of, some aspects of the agreement.2 8 8 As noted earlier, in ordering
construction of the Severity Chart and the database, Judge Hellerstein
was privy to information about the litigation that gave him a unique
perspective. Having played a managerial role in bringing about the
settlement discussions, he was invested to see that the process leading
to settlement was fair. In this regard, he had reason to believe that it
might not have been-that the plaintiffs' lawyers were not sufficiently
pressured to obtain the best deal for their clients.
Historically, in the context of so-called "settlement class actions,"
plaintiffs' counsel have been criticized for "selling out" their clients. 28 9
In those cases, plaintiffs' lawyers have brought mass tort claims seemingly for the purpose of threatening large corporate defendants with
financial destruction and then settling, with court approval after class
action certification, for low per claim amounts and high attorneys'
fees.2 90 Such was certainly not the case here 29 1 : the 9/11 litigation was
not a class action and did not, after congressional intervention, seriously threaten the defendants with financial destruction.
Why, then, may the judge have been concerned with the plaintiffs' lawyers settling too low in the 9/11 litigation? The case had gone
on for seven years (four of which were devoured by costly appeals on
287
Compare Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 54-57
(questioning the fairness of the proposed settlement), with Transcript of Status Conference (June 10, 2010), supra note 201, at 39-41 (lauding improvements in the new settlement proposal).
288 There has been considerable discussion on the subject of nonclass, consolidated
mass tort litigation and its shared characteristics with class actions. Accordingly, nonclass,
consolidated mass tort cases have been referred to as quasi-class actions, subject to the
court's power to ensure justice and fairness. For more, see In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.,
433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271-72 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); L. Elizabeth Chamblee, UnsettlingEfficiency:

When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 IA. L. REv. 157,
240-42 (2004); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-ClassAction Method of Managing Multi-DistrictLitigations: Problems and a Proposa4 63 VAND. L. REv. 107, 113-20 (2010);

Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469, 480-81
(1994).
289
Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products,
Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1050-56, 1147 (1995); see Developments in the Law--The Paths
of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1752, 1811 (2000); Alon Klement, Who Should Guardthe
Guardians?A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LrIc. 25, 39-41

(2002); Shimon Sternhell, The Judiciary's Role in Consolidated Litigation 12-19 (Jan. 24,
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
290
See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 801-03 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting a class action settlement, the court noted that "class
counsel effected a settlement that would yield very substantial rewards to them after what,
in comparison to the $9.5 million dollar fee, was little work"); Koniak, supra note 289, at
1051-56.
291
In fact, some 9/11 plaintiffs are receiving settlement awards that exceed $1 million.
Telephone Interview with Matthew Garretson, Esq., 9/11 Settlement Allocation Neutral,
Garretson Resolution Grp. (Aug. 29, 2011).
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the issues of jurisdiction and immunity).2 9 2 It was reasonable to assume that plaintiffs' liaison counsel were under extraordinary financial pressure to settle.2 93 Indeed, plaintiffs' lawyers had borrowed
substantial sums of money to finance the litigation.2 9 4 Undoubtedly
under intense pressure from the City of New York, the Captive had
decided to retain almost $500 million to protect against future
claims.29 5 Given the judge's perception of the doubtful likelihood of
plaintiffs' success in future litigation, he viewed the amount of the
retained reserve to be excessive.2 96 Outside insurance, covering a substantial portion of defense costs up to the time of settlement, placed
defendants in a far better financial position to continue the litigation.2 9 7 Thus, Judge Hellerstein had a solid foundation for wanting to
292 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum Responding to the Court's Sua Sponte Order of August 4, 2010 at 11-14, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH)
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2010), available at http://www.877wtchero.com/wtcverdict/8-25-10/9docs/Final-Memorandum-Responding-to-Aug-4-2010-Order.pdf; Mark Hamblett, Hellerstein
Praises 'Very Good' WTCDea N.Y. L.J., June 11, 2010, at 1.
293 See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 769 F. Supp. 2d 650, 652 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
294 By 2010, plaintiffs' attorneys, Napoli Bern Ripka and Worby Groner Edelman, had
borrowed more than $30 million to help finance over seven years of litigation. Mireya
Navarro, Already Under Fire, Lawyers for 9/11 Workers Are Ordered to Justify Some Fees, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, at A16. The partners of the firm personally guaranteed these loans,
which had interest rates ranging from six to eighteen percent. Worby Groner Edelman &
Napoli Bern LLP, Statement to Our Clients About Litigation Interest Charges, available at
http://www.877wtchero.com/wtcverdict/STATEMENT-TO-OUR-CLIENTS-ABOUT-LITIGATION-INTEREST-CHARGES.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2012). By August 2010, the interest on these loans amounted to a staggering $6.1 million. Navarro, supra.
295 See DEPAu.MA, supra note 2, at 317-18.
296 See Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 59.
297 See WTC Captive Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 549 F. Supp. 2d 555, 557-60
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). In the wake of the massive cleanup effort that the September 11 attacks
necessitated, the City of New York obtained insurance protection from several insurance
companies. Id. at 557-58. The insurers "undertook to 'defend and indemnify the City and
its contractors against claims of bodily injury, property damage, personal injury or advertising injury' arising from the clean-up efforts at the World Trade Center covering the period
from September 11, 2001 to December 31, 2002." Id. at 558. Ultimately, however, some of
the insurers "disclaimed liability and any obligation to provide a defense." Id. at 559. Consequently, on February 16, 2007, the Captive filed a lawsuit against the insurers "seeking a
declaration that the .. . [ilnsurers had a duty to defend the City and its contractors in the
21 MC 100 litigation, [as well as] damages-essentially, reimbursement of defense expenses advanced by WTC Captive." Id. at 560.
On May 27, 2008, Judge Hellerstein entered final judgment in favor of the Captive,
holding that the insurers had an ongoing duty to defend the City and its contractors. Rule
60(b) (5) Order Satisfying Final judgment, and Releasing and Discharging Excess Insurers
and Supersedeas Bond at 1, WTC Captive Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 071209(AKH) (THK) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010). Subsequently, the insurers appealed to the
Second Circuit. Notice of Parties' Joint Consent Motion Pursuant to FRCP 60(b)(5) to
Relieve Excess Insurers from the Final Judgment and to Discharge Supersedes Bond at 2,
HTC Captive Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 07-1209(AKH) (THK) (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 29, 2010). However, before their appeal was heard, the parties reached a confidential
settlement agreement and requested the Second Circuit to dismiss their appeal. Id. The
dismissal was granted on January 19, 2010, and the case was remanded to Judge Heller-
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ensure that the plaintiffs received, and were generally perceived to
have received, a fair settlement. After all, the plaintiffs in these cases
were public heroes, many of whom were severely injured; thus, any
widespread perception that the settlement was unfair was to be
avoided, within reason.
Regarding the court's reduction of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees,
since most of the cases would not go to trial, Judge Hellerstein believed that allowing a contingent fee of one-third was not justified in
light of the work that had gone into reaching the settlement.298 The
defendants certainly had no interest in monitoring the fairness of the
plaintiffs' lawyers' fees. Their concern was to minimize the amount of
money to be paid out of the Captive's $1 billion-plus fund. Because
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees were deducted from their recoveries, defendants were indifferent as to the amounts of these fees. Ultimately, the
plaintiffs' lawyers agreed to a reduction of their contingent fees from
thirty-three percent to twenty-five percent.2 9 9 They did so following
Judge Hellerstein's stern admonition that he would not allow a contingent fee of one-third.30 0
Ultimately, Judge Hellerstein approved a revised settlement package that gave the plaintiffs $125 million more-from the Captive fund
and in reduced attorneys' fees-than they would have received in the
original settlement.3 0 ' Judge Hellerstein had considered that even
more could be added to the plaintiffs' package but realized that at
some point his authority would be challenged on appeal, resulting in
years of delay and depriving plaintiffs of recoveries they were long
waiting for. Having reached what he perceived to be an acceptable
level of benefits, he approved the revised settlement.3 0 2
stein. Id. On January 29, 2010, after conducting an in-camera review of the settlement and
after being informed that plaintiffs' attorneys did not object to the settlement, the judge
declared the final judgment satisfied. Rule 60(b) (5) Order Satisfying Final Judgment, and
Releasing and Discharging Excess Insurers and Supersedeas Bond, supra, at 3. The special
masters, who co-author this Article, estimate the settlement agreement to be in the neighborhood of $200 million.
298 Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 56. In addition
to the fees generated from the settlement with the Captive (on behalf of the City and its
contractors), it was expected that plaintiffs' counsel would generate substantial additional
fees from ancillary settlements with the Port Authority, the Fresh Kills defendants, the
Weeks Marine insurer, and Survivair, Inc. See supra note 38. This expectation materialized
when the ancillary settlements yielded over $100 million to plaintiffs. See supra note 38.
299 Transcript of Status Conference (June 10, 2010), supra note 201, at 8.
00 Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 56.
301 Order Acknowledging, and Setting Hearing on, Modified and Improved Agreement of Settlement, supra note 208, at 1; see supra note 233.
302 See Order Proposing Amendment to Special Masters' Agreement at 1-2, In re World
Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., Nos. 21 MC 100(AKH), 21 MC 102(AKH), 21 MC 103(AKH)
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2010) (order approving modified and improved agreement of
settlement).
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VIII
THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE DISTRICT JUDGE3 03
In 2002, the Clerk's Office randomly assigned to me the case of a
first responder at the WTC disaster site, alleging injuries from exposure to the toxins at the site.3 04 Further assignments followed, accelerating over time, until I came to preside over more than thirteen
thousand cases related to the 9/11 disaster while carrying a normal
load of civil and criminal cases that are the daily fare of a federal districtjudge.s0 5 As the 9/11 cases grew in number, I struggled with the
task of how to manage this complex litigation.
I looked for guidance in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Manual for Complex Litigation. But aside from general language
that appears to give a district court judge considerable leeway in
"adopting special procedures" to manage pleadings, schedule discovery, and exercise control over the litigation,30 6 I found myself trying to
manage litigation in which many persons had suffered a wide array of
injuries from exposures in hundreds, if not thousands, of different
circumstances.
After appointing liaison counsel for plaintiffs and defendants and
instituting procedures for effective communication among counsel
and with the court, I began to realize that there were simply too many
plaintiffs and defendants in this litigation. Too many plaintiffs, as yet
uninjured, had signed contingent fee agreements believing that they
had nothing to lose and might have something to gain, particularly if
03 This Part presents the viewpoints of Judge Hellerstein, and is recounted from his
perspective.
304 Hickey v. City of New York, No. 02 Civ. 08434(AKH) (S.D.NY. Oct. 23, 2002); Taha
v. City of New York, No. 02 Civ. 05288(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2002); see Effron, supra
note 10, at 2431. As early as January 2002, I was assigned cases alleging commonplace
construction injuries suffered at the WTC site that were removed to federal court pursuant
to the ATSSSA. See supra note 39. In Graybill v. City of New York and Spagnuolo v. Port
Authority of New York & New Jersey, I held that federal jurisdiction did not lie for injuries

arising from activities and risks typically associated with construction sites and remanded
the cases to the New York State Supreme Court. 247 F. Supp. 2d 345, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
245 F. Supp. 2d 518, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
305 I was assigned many other 9/11 cases. Local Court Rule 13 provides that in order
to promote justice and efficiency the same judge should handle related cases. As a result, I
was assigned ninety-five wrongful death and personal injury actions brought against the
aviation companies, and other categories of cases relating to the September 11 attack: the
personal injury actions brought by the first responders (the subject of this Article); the
property damage suits against those same defendants; the lawsuits arising from the collapse
of Tower Seven and the consequent destruction of the Con Ed power station beneath the
tower; the lawsuits of the construction and cleanup workers in buildings adjacent to the
WTC; the disputes among insurers and reinsurers to sort out the potential liability and
expense for destroyed property and business in the WTC; and a lawsuit contending that
the WTC debris covering the garbage in the Fresh Kills landfill made the landfill hallowed
ground, requiring a cemetery to be made of the landfill.
306

FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) (2) (L); see MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION, FOURTH § 10.1

(4th ed. 2004).
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they later become ill due to their exposure to the WTC site.30 7 And
too many defendants were implicated because plaintiffs' counsel appeared to be suing every contractor who had anything whatsoever to
do with the work site. As my concern in these regards mounted, I
found no easy way to winnow the docket to focus on more meritorious
claims or claims of substantial injury.
Advocates look for leverage. Plaintiffs exert leverage by bringing
large numbers of cases, often with inadequate regard to the merits of
the claims. They believe that the in terrorem effect of mass claims may
lead to quick settlements. Plaintiffs' counsels' assumption is that large
numbers of claims produce added exposure to defendants, ii potential liability and defense expenses, increasing incentives to settle.
Plaintiffs' counsel also tend to join as many defendants as possible to
increase the number of potential contributors to settlement and to
create opportunities for cross pleadings by defendants against one another, adding additional expense to defendants and creating the risk
of one defendant seeking to prove fault against other defendants.30
Defendants also seek to gain leverage. Defendants exert leverage
by pressuring the plaintiffs' contingent fee structure. Defendants'
counsel is paid on a current and hourly basis and staff liberally. 0 9
The result leads to extensive discovery, numerous motions, and a general prolongation of proceedings. It becomes expensive for plaintiffs'
counsel to fund the litigation, and a practice has grown of financing
mass tort actions at high compound interest rates with repayment deferred until a settlement or recovery is accomplished.3 10
Discovery proceedings cannot be conducted in connection with
ten thousand claims. In other cases, judges have used sampling techniques to select a few claims for early discovery and trials and then, if
the mass did not settle, another few, and so on.3 11 But this procedure
did not seem appropriate for the WTC claims. The illnesses alleged
by the workers were too varied and too numerous, and the causal relationships of the workers to their worksites were too controversial to
307

See generallyJonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND.

L.J. 59, 95 (1997) (noting that, due to contingent fee arrangements, "plaintiffs have an
incentive to file lawsuits whenever an attorney is willing to represent them").
308
I did not allow cross pleadings and third-party pleadings.
See Molot, supra note 307, at 69.
Binyamin Appelbaum, PuttingMoney on Lawsuits, Investors Share in the Payouts, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at Al; Ben Hallman & Binyamin Appelbaum, Betting on justice: Borrowing to Sue, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 16, 2011, 6:59 PM), http://
309
310

www.iwatchnews.org/2010/11/15/2320/betting-justice-borrowing-sue (noting that lenders
provided $35 million to fund the lawsuits brought by the injured Ground Zero workers and
earned approximately $11 million).
See, e.g., In reVioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 452 (E.D. La. 2006); Fallon
311
et al., supra note 159, at 2232-35 (stating that six bellwether trials were conducted in the
Vioxx litigation and one bellwether trial was conducted in the pharmaceutical Propulsid
litigation).
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lend themselves to useful sampling techniques.3 1 2 I believed that a
system should be devised to allow basic discovery by court-ordered interrogatories addressed to all plaintiffs and defendants, with the goal
of creating a reliable database that counsel and the court could access.
With such a database, the court could select bellwether claims, not
blindly or as one or another counsel conceived, but according to criteria that focused on merits and severity of injury, for those were the
claims that most merited resolution and that would most likely affect
similarly situated claims.3 13
With the help of the special masters and the involvement of counsel, a database was designed and a set of approximately 368 questions
were propounded that each litigant was required to answer separately,
responsively, and under oath as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33
required to provide a common core of information about each claim
and all claims that the court and all counsel could access.31 4 The information revealed the relative severity of the most commonly alleged
injuries and the length and timing of each plaintiffs exposure to the
site. The database also showed plaintiffs' preexisting conditions,
smoking habits, and the safety equipment that was or was not used at
the WTC site.31 5 The database provided the court and the parties with
an overview of the entire plaintiff population.3 1 6
Using the database, we established a procedure to choose a sample of claims for intensive discovery, motions, and trial, sequenced according to a master schedule covering all filed claims. 3 17 Thus, we
were able to choose plaintiffs for early discovery3 18 and trials with a
See supra note 305.
See, e.g., Case Management Order No. 8, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2008) (establishing a method by which bellwether
cases were to be selected based on factors including the severity of injury, duration of
exposure, and others).
314
See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 501-02 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); Transcript of Status Conference (Nov. 28, 2006), supra note 124, at 33-34.
315
See In re World Trade Ctr. DisasterSite Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 506-22; supra Part
IV.C.
316
See supra Part IV.E.
317
See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 503-05; supra Part
IV.D.
318
Various management techniques facilitated the efficient and orderly progress of
the accelerated discovery program. I provided that all discovery disputes should come to
me directly, without preliminary reviews by special masters or magistrate judges, and that
discovery disputes be presented to me by joint letter rather than by formal motion, with
each side stating its separate positions within twenty-four hours of receiving the other side's
position. And I committed to rule within twenty-four hours, if possible, to resolve the dispute. My individual Rule 2E was the model. SeeHon. Alvin K. Hellerstein, Individual Rules
of the Honorable Alvin K. Hellerstein, available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/
show.php?db=judgeinfo&id=575. Rule 2E provides:
Unless directed otherwise, counsel shall describe their disputes in a
single letter, jointly composed. Separate and successive letters will be returned, unread. Strict adherence to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) (2) (A), the meet
312

313

20121]

MANAGERIAL JUDGING

175

wide variety of injuries and lengths of exposure.3 19 Moreover, we not
only set a schedule for discovery and trials for the first thirty plaintiffs
but also set a comprehensive plan for discovery and trial for all ten
thousand plaintiffs over a period of two years.320 There was to be no
respite32 1 : the schedule was relentless and unforgiving.
As more and more plaintiffs answered the interrogatories, the
database provided an overview of the entire litigation: How many suffered severe injuries, light injuries, or no injuries at all? From which
illnesses did plaintiffs suffer from? How many plaintiffs smoked or
had preexisting conditions? How long did each plaintiff work and at
which subsite? Which employers did each plaintiff work for and was
protective equipment provided? The inquiries could continue indefinitely. The special masters prepared a survey report and, at my suggestion, gave copies to the attorneys.
Soon after, the parties produced a proposed settlement for the 21
MC 100 cases, the Settlement Process Agreement, described earlier in
this Article. 322 Incident to the court's obligation to exercise judicial
management to supervise the litigation for fairness and efficiency, I
saw my task as twofold: First, I had to determine whether the proposed
settlement agreement was fair to the plaintiffs, substantively and procedurally.32 3 And second, I had to make sure that proper mechanisms
were in place to allow all plaintiffs to receive adequate information
upon which to base their decisions regarding whether to join the settlement. Regarding the first issue, after review, I disapproved the proposed settlement plan because, considering the amount of reserves
that the Captive intended to keep for future claims and the percentages going to the lawyers, too little would end up being paid to the
plaintiffs.32 4 If ever there were to be a mass tort settlement that had to
be fair and be perceived to be so, this was it.325 The parties renegotiand confer rule, is required, and should be described in the joint submission as to time, place and duration, naming the counsel involved in the
discussion. The Court will not resolve disputes not brought to its attention
in conformity with this rule.
Id. The rapid turnaround time of twenty-four hours promoted efficiency by eliminating
most of the incentive for objecting to discovery and filing discovery motions.
319 See supra Part IV.D (stating that thirty cases were scheduled to be tried on May 17,
2010).
320 See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
321 See id. (setting forth that Judge Hellerstein required strict adherence to the schedule and did not permit deviations because of weekends or legal holidays).
322 See supra Part V.
323
See Order Acknowledging, and Setting Hearing on, Modified and Improved Agreement of Settlement, supra note 208, at 1-4; Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19,
2010), supra note 10, at 61-63; supra Part VL
324
See Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 55-56, 59;
supra Part VII.
325
See Transcript of Status Conference (Mar. 19, 2010), supra note 10, at 53, 63;
DEPALMA, supra note 2, at 321.
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ated and returned with a more attractive package-fair in my mind,
although not perfect-and I approved it.326 The result was an increase of more than $125 million in plaintiffs' recovery, of which $50
million reflected an additional cash contribution by the Captive, another $50 million (approximately) reflected a reduction in contingent-fee-percentage by plaintiffs' attorneys, and $25 million to $50
million reflected agreements by workers' compensation and disability
insurance carriers to waive liens they held against plaintiffs' recoveries. 3 2 7 One aspect of the settlement was crucial to my approval. I
had insisted from the start that most of the compensation must be
directed to those most seriously injured. Unlike some settlements in
which the plaintiffs' counsel allocates the gross amount as they see fit,
this settlement allocated different amounts for each category of injury. 28 The net result was that ninety-five percent of the settlement
went to those most seriously hurt.3 2 9
Regarding the second issue of whether plaintiffs received adequate information to decide whether to opt into the settlement, I appointed an ethics specialist to review written communications3 3 0 and
various special counsel to communicate with and advise both those
plaintiffs who had stopped taking calls from liaison counsel3 3 1 and
those who continued to be represented by liaison counsel even
though they had previously given releases that purportedly barred
them from suing.3 32
Several judges have taken note of the phenomenon of the quasiclass action in mass torts.3 33 And some commentators have observed
326
See Order Approving Modified and Improved Agreement of Settlement at 1-4, In re
World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., Nos. 21 MC 100(AKH), 21 MC 102(AKH), 21 MC
103(AKH) (S.DN.Y. June 23, 2010); DEPALMA, supra note 2 at 325; supra Part VII.
327
See Transcript of Status Conference (June 10, 2010), supra note 201, at 8.
328
Id. at 9.
329
See DEPALMA, supra note 2, at 325.
330
Order Acknowledging, and Setting Hearing on, Modified and Improved Agreement of Settlement, supra note 208, at 1-4 (appointing Professor Roy D. Simon to review
communications to plaintiffs regarding amended settlement agreement); Hamblett, supra
note 292.
331
Michael Hoenig was appointed special counsel to assist hundreds of plaintiffs who
had not decided whether to opt into the amended settlement agreement. In re World
Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 762 F. Supp. 2d 631, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). "These Eligible
Plaintiffs consisted of several subgroups; persons who could not be located despite diligent
efforts; persons who declined to communicate with their counsel; persons who expressed a
desire to opt into the SPA but who had not completed their paperwork; and persons who
were on the Eligible Plaintiffs list but who expressed a desire to withdraw from the lawsuit."
Id.
332
Mark Hamblett, 9/11 PlaintiffsFirmIs Ordered to Work with Conflicts Counsel, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 15, 2011, at 1.
333
In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 612-13 (E.D. La. 2008); In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (assuming the characterization as a quasi-class action); Weinstein, supra note 288, at 480-81 ("What is clear from
the huge consolidations required in mass torts is that they have many of the characteristics
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differences between classic class actions and this newer, hybrid creature.3 3 4 Most of mass tort litigation takes place within the framework
of multidistrict litigation (MDL) consolidation of cases for discovery
that often results in global settlements.3 3 5 In the 9/11 responders'
litigation, the claims were consolidated because Congress mandated
that all of them be brought in the Southern District of New York.3 36
But the underlying problems are similar. Inadequate attention has
been paid to the enormous complexities that attend these claims.
Though I believe that I acted consistently with the federal rules, the
litigants believe that I overstepped the boundaries. It is time for the
Judicial Conference of the United States, the American Law Institute,
and the Federal Judicial Center to address the issues raised in this
Article. On the one hand, if I was right in asserting supervisory control of the litigation and rejecting the initial settlement, then those
powers should be clearly set forth so that the next judge who faces
these issues does not feel overly constrained for fear of appellate reversal.3 3 7 On the other hand, if I was wrong, then an explicit rule
should define the proper constraints. In any event, if this Article contributes to a more thorough, informed analysis by those charged with
formulating policy and articulating a rule (one way or another), our
efforts in writing it will have been rewarded.
CONCLUSION

This Article has focused on the innovative strategies that Judge
Hellerstein developed in order to bring about a settlement in the
9/11 responders' tort litigation, one of the most complex and symbolically significant mass tort cases in the history of American jurisprudence. For those who question whether the judge exceeded his
authority in managing a nonclass mass tort litigation, it is unclear what
alternative he might have embraced. Earlier efforts to stay within
of class actions... . It is my conclusion ... that mass consolidations are in effect quasi-class
actions.").
334
See Chamblee, supra note 288, at 160-161; Silver & Miller, supra note 288 at 109-10;
Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee Ill, From Class Actions to Multidistnct Consolidations:
Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KA. L. Ruv. 775, 803-04 (2010) ("[Procedural rules] force nonclass settlements 'awkwardly within either the class action device or the
traditional model of the one-on-one lawsuit' when they are in fact hybrids of the two litigation models.").
335
Silver & Miller, supra note 288, at 108.
336 ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408, 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001).
337
Chamblee, supra note 288, at 235 (noting that the adjudication of mass torts should
require judicial approval of all postaggregation settlements and that, to ensure such judicial regulation, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) statute should be
amended); Judith Resnik, Litigating and Settling Class Actions: The Prerequisitesof Entry and
Exit, 30 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 835, 858 (1997) ("Judges should be obliged to structure settlement negotiations (ex ante) and to evaluate settlements (ex post) in all aggregates, be they
called class actions, MDLs, consolidations or whatever.").
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more traditional bounds had inexorably led to impasse. To have allowed the cases to grind their way to individual trials and settlements
would have extended the litigation over decades and had the potential of doing substantial injustice to plaintiffs who had placed their
lives on the line to help the city and the country through an unprecedented crisis. The comprehensive settlement that Judge Hellerstein
made possible resulted in ninety-nine percent of plaintiffs opting to
accept the settlement, no mean accomplishment.3 38 That the federal
court forced revision of the original settlement and put its imprimatur
on the revised agreement were essential factors in achieving the high
opt-in percentage.
In any event, the 9/11-tort-litigation saga is not yet complete. A
small number of plaintiffs opted out of the settlement. If they do not
enter into the Zadroga compensation scheme, their cases will proceed
to settlement or trial. Other plaintiffs filed new tort claims after the
settlement was completed and their cases will also have to be resolved.
And future plaintiffs who manifest injuries in the years to come will
almost certainly press their claims. If they do not join Zadroga, they,
too, will have to litigate or settle their cases. Finally, some 1,500 plaintiffs, most of whom worked in the cleanup of approximately sixty
buildings near the 9/11 site, are claiming injuries from the various
toxins that emanated from the collapse of the twin towers."3
Although we can hope that this country will never again face the
horrors of a 9 /1i-type attack, it is certain that nonclass mass tort cases
will continue to be brought to our courts. One does not have to posit
a case with over three hundred different types of physical injuries to
test the capacity of courts to manage such litigation. Cases that involve the interaction of several different drugs resulting in a host of
different injuries will raise similar questions even when, as with the
9/11 litigation, they are based on traditionally recognized tort theories. Defendants will include pharmaceutical manufacturers, medical
practitioners, hospitals, and managed care insurers. Complex environmental cases involving multiple defendants and thousands of
plaintiffs will continue to challenge our courts. Absent meaningful
guidance from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, nothing short of
creative judicial management will save these cases from dragging on
338
As of this writing, only one of the eighty-five original respiratory and cancer cases
that were eligible for the settlement remains. Of the newly filed cases (those filed after the
date set by the settlement agreement), only nine remain. In addition, eight cases alleging
physical injuries incurred at the WTC worksite remain pending.
3
The defendants in these cases, classified under master docket 21 MC 102, are the
owners, tenants, and managers of the buildings in which the cleanup crews worked. Plaintiffs claim these defendants violated the New York safe place statute and are thus liable to
plaintiffs for their injuries. With so many plaintiffs who worked in different buildings
under different conditions, these cases are proving to be very complex.
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for decades. The 9/11 litigation suggests that, with strong judicial
management, these cases can be resolved fairly and expeditiously. By
February 2012, almost all participating plaintiffs had received the payments due to them under the 9/11 revised settlement.34 0 That is an
accomplishment worthy of emulation and replication.

340 As of September 29, 2012, two disputes remain unresolved: one regarding
mandatory bonus payments and another regarding mandatory contingent payments, both
under the terms of the settlement agreement. The agreement provides that the Captive is
required to disburse bonus payments when the plaintiffs' opt-in percentage reaches certain
benchmarks, and contingent payments in each of the five years following the settlement if
newly filed cases, or payments by the Captive to dischargejudgments or settlements, do not
exceed certain other benchmarks. The district court ordered the Captive to make both
these categories of payments to the settling plaintiffs. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site
Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In reWorld Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
Nos. 21 MC 100(AKH), 21 MC 102, 21 MC 103, 2012 WL3029637, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 11,
2012). The district court's orders add approximately $60 million to the settlement. Appeals by the defendants from both these orders are pending before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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